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ABSTRACT
Nudging The House of Cards:
Brain Physiology and Critical Consciousness
May 1984
Gad S. von Hahmann, B.A., Syracuse University
MIA, School for International Training
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Horace Reed
For human beings, consciousness has both an illusory func-
tion and a critical function. The illusory function allows us to see
rocks, trees, sky, animals, other humans instead of a constantly
changing fluctuation of subatomic particles
. While important in help-
ing us adapt to our environment (and in evolution), the illusory
function causes us to see what we expect to see, to think what we
are used to thinking, to be habitually reactive rather than creative.
The critical function, on the other hand, can help us to break out
of habit, to be aware of the whole picture by looking for the unex-
pected and thinking in new ways. For most of us the critical func-
tion is overwhelmed by the illusory function as a result of living
in social systems which are not self-conscious. The underdevelop-
ment of critical consciousness in today's societies, both industrialized
and industrializing, has led to the atrophy of the individual's self-
conscious capacity to choose and, subsequently, to the relinquish-
ing of decision-making power at both the personal and political levels.
vii
The study proposes that the development of critical conscious-
ness requires the self-conscious capacity to choose, and that self-
consciousness depends upon the training and use of our innate in-
tuitive capacity. Further, the study presents physiological evidence
for the role of intuition in developing the critical function of con-
sciousness
. Chapter II describes the need for a new paradigm with-
in which to understand this aspect of consciousness which has re-
mained "hidden." Chapter III emphasizes those aspects of brain
physiology which underlie our intuitive capacity. Chapter IV de-
scribes how it is possible for us to become more self-conscious about
our thought and action through training this capacity. Finally, spe-
cific skills in introspection are described for use in educational set-
tings
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I consider the fundamental theme of
our epoch to be that of domination-
which implies its opposite, the theme
liberation
,
as the objective to be
achieved (Freire, 1970, p.93).
Background
Motion and change are constant in the universe, in human so-
cial systems, and in the brain of each individual. Often it is this
very constancy of motion and change, and its great speed, which
helps things to appear not to change, which helps to create the
illusion of stability
. The wooden table which is also a mass of
moving atoms, the social system of capitalist democracy which is
mass of fluctuating smaller systems and individuals, our bodies and
brains which constantly regenerate at the molecular level 1 — all of
these phenomena present to us a unique combination of constant
motion and stability. It is in fact, through the process of con-
sciousness that such motion and change achieve stability in our
minds
.
Social change is no exception. Our conscious process helps
create the appearance, the illusion, that changes in society occur
in given cycles, according to given patterns. Ideas based on this
illusion often result in oppressive conclusions, for example, that
since there have always been people who live in wealth and people
1
2who live in poverty, poverty and wealth are "facts of life" and will
continue regardless of what we do. The fact is that human action
creates social change. This study is based on the assumption that
the predominating action in global society today is creating change
resulting in the increasing oppression of greater numbers of people,
both within the United States and in the rest of the world.
It is a second assumption of this paper that education has a
major role and responsibility in preparing people to direct social
change in a positive way and that education can and should em-
power people and help them to develop critical consciousness. The
development of critical consciousness is necessary to enable us to
monitor and influence this helpful but limiting illusory function of
consciousness
. And the mechanism through which critical con-
sciousness works to accomplish this task is that of recognizing our
self-conscious capacity to make choices.
The Need for Critical Consciousness in Massified Society
The stifling of this self-conscious capacity to choose occurs in
many ways. As one example, Paulo Freire, whose theory of criti-
cal consciousness this paper supports
,
suggests that people living
in a highly technological society (such as the United States) tend
to become "massified" through constant maneuvering by the "truth"
of the media and less and less real participation in decision making.
Indeed, an analysis of highly technological societies usually
reveals the "domestication" of (the individual's) critical fac-
ulties by a situation in which s/he is massified and has only
the illusion of choice ... (the individual) comes to accept myth-
ical explanations of... reality (Freire 1973, p.34). (Emphasis
added
.
)
3This domestication or stunting of self-conscious capacity is
explained in detail by Freire when he talks of the "dominated con-
sciousness" of the middle class. He refers to a situation where
middle class people are unable to perceive a generative theme of
oppression in their own lives due to the inherent contradictions of
their class position. He calls this contradiction a "limit- situation"
(Freire, 1970, p.92).
As an example we might take the case of inequities which
have existed in higher education admissions procedures for women
and minorities in the United States. People may begin to perceive
that certain higher education admission procedures do in fact dis-
criminate against certain groups; yet they also perceive that action
against these procedures most likely would have a negative effect
on their own group
. They do not take action against the discrim-
inatory procedure because they "know" that "everyone has the op-
portunity to achieve" in this country and therefore, since the sys-
tem is fair, the difficulty must lie not with the procedure but with
the other group's demands.
In this example, members of the majority group are unable to
perceive the totality of the limit- situation : that the higher educa-
tion system has and does discriminate against certain groups, and
that this discrimination may be due in part to the present capitalist
2
structure of our society. In any case, the inability to perceive
a total picture of the existence of discrimination and its orgins pro-
4hibits a truly self-conscious action in response to the original
feeling against the admission procedures. In Freire’s words:
...fear of freedom leads them (individuals of the middle class)to erect defense mechanisms and rationalizations which concealthe fundamental, emphasize the fortuitous, and deny concrete
rea ty
. In the face of a problem whose analysis would lead
to the uncomfortable perception of a limit- situation
,
their ten-dency is to remain on the periphery of the discussion and re-
sist any attempt to reach the heart of the question (Freire
1970, p . 94) . vc,
Such "defense mechanisms and rationalizations" we can recognize as
racist and sexist tendencies in people's everyday behavior.
The inability to perceive a total picture, to analyze one’s own
environment, the inability to be self-conscious about one's concep-
tual framework, prevents us from seeing how our lives are inter-
dependent with the lives of others across class, racial, religious,
and national boundaries. We are thus unable to perceive alternative
actions which might result in more just and equitable arrangements
for all involved. The possibility of choosing whether to be racist
or not does not occur to most of us who behave that way.
I believe that Freire’s words describing Brazil in the 1950's
are applicable in the United States today:
The education our situation demanded would enable (people) to
discuss courageously the problems of their context - and to
intervene in that context... to reevaluate constantly, to analyze
"findings," to adopt scientific methods and processes, and to
perceive themselves in dialectical relationship with their social
reality ... education could help (people) to assume an increasingly
critical attitude toward the world and so to transform it (Freire,
1973, p. 34-5).
The illusion of people's participation in our democracy is supported
by a reality in which people do not participate due to an inability
5to move beyond the limit- situations surrounding- us. The mainte-
nance of decision-making power by the few resulting in the ineq-
uitable distribution of not only wealth but justice both here and
abroad provide the backdrop for this study.
In a social system such as ours which creates such a full
illusion of equality of opportunity but which realizes that ideal
with less and less effectiveness both here and in the nations it
supports, the ability to cut through this illusion, to critically
analyze the underlying reality, requires new educational emphasis
on skills for self-conscious choice. This kind of empowering edu-
cation is based on an experiential model which can be directly
adapted to include skills for self-conscious choice.
Problem and Purpose - Experience as a Way of Knowing
On the surface, learning from experience is not a problematic
concept, nor is the relationship of experience to learning an unex-
plored phenomenon. For the purpose of this study, the Experi-
ential Learning Cycle (see Fig.l) expresses this relationship most
succinctly
. That is
,
experience as action or problem solving is at
the core of the learning experience. (I have added the self-
evaluation component to this model)
. The problem remains for soci-
ety
,
and for education in particular, to give legitimacy to the no-
tion of experiential learning in all of its phases
,
that is
,
to recog-
nize the learner's capacity for becoming self-conscious about every
phase in this cycle. This capacity involves reflection, self-con-
sciously choosing, and acting on the basis of choice.
6(student participation in real
or simulated experience)
(student generalized concepts (student learns concepts
assisted by trainer through involved in experience)
lectures, readings & other
cognitive methods)
Figure 1: Experiential Learning Cycle
(Adapted from Peace Corps training materials)
7This capacity for self-consciousness is, I believe, what makes
praxis possible. Praxis, as Freire defines it, is the integration of
reflection and action by people in order to transform the world
(1973, P • 66) . However, it is just this integration of reflection and
action which so often does not occur in the educational process.
As Kindervatter points out in her 1979 study of education as an
empowering process, in the two cases studied it was this phase of
the cycle which did not occur. She points out that action as a re-
sult of reflection with critical consciousness can lead to action
which confronts the causes
,
rather than the symptoms
,
of a prob-
lem" (p. 232).
This ability to reflect critically
,
with the self-conscious knowl-
edge that choice in action is possible, is what is lacking in educa-
tional programs and in societies like ours where action without self-
consciousness continues to promote oppression here and abroad.
There is, however, a second aspect to the problem. Although
experience is perceived as important to learning even by those
who do not use purely experiential methods
,
the interactive or dia-
lectical nature of experience requires greater elaboration than it
has received in educational circles to date . The concept is straight-
forward: by acting upon something we change it and we, in turn,
are changed by that action. Evidence that such change can be
physiological as well as psychological is presented in subsequent
sections of this study. It is this change occurring as we experi-
ence, as we act, which provides the substance for reflection en-
abling us to learn.
8Experience cannot have meaning-, says Dewey, without some
element of thought, and "(t)hought or reflection ... is the discern-
ment of the relation between what we try to do and what happens
in consequence" (1916, 1944, p. 144-5). However, this power of
reflection receives little direct attention in teaching methods
. The
ability to direct reflection through self-conscious attention is not
treated as teachable or trainable except in a very few circum-
O
stances which seldom carry over into mainstream education. Ac-
companying this lack of focus on reflective skills is an unfortunate
development of long standing in the history of the science of know-
ing: a mistrust of, and therefore lack in understanding of, subjec-
tive knowledge and its companion skill, introspection.
The psychology of learning and teaching has, until very re-
cently
,
persistently ignored the information available to us about
how the brain is involved in both learning and teaching. Although
all too many of the details of brain physiology are frustratingly
speculative, I believe that enough basic knowledge is available to
be seriously considered supportive to the development of critical
consciousness as a teaching methodology. Hypotheses which neuro-
biologists are willing to state or speculate upon give reason to ex-
plore self-conscious choice as a key to the development of the
brain's critical capacity.
The purpose of this study is to explore consciousness as a
process which transforms experience into action, to explore learn-
ing as it relates to the brain's capacity for reflection and choice.
9to consider intuition as a special aspect of learning, and to de-
scribe introspective skills which can be used (and tested further?)
in the development of critical consciousness.
Procedure - An Exercise in Subjective Knowledge
For this study the consideration of consciousness will be wholis-
tic in the sense that many fields of knowledge are considered rele-
vant to the discussion. The study does not pretend, however, to
consider every field of knowledge and does focus primarily on the
psychology and neurophysiology of learning. The focus on the lat-
ter may be viewed as reductionist. Like others who enter the fray
to begin to define consciousness, I cannot subscribe completely to
either the wholistic or the reductionist view, 4 but prefer to take an
integrative approach from as many fields as possible.
Although I seek to make a case in Chapter II for a new para-
digm to help us understand consciousness it will become evident to
the reader that my own conceptual framework is heavily influenced
by the historical materialist approach (in particular, the dialectical
aspect of this approach) to the study of change and human devel-
opment. I take this approach for a specific reason. I agree with
William Connolly (1974), a social scientist, and Robert Miller (1981),
a neurobiologist, who both believe that scholars in their respective
fields ought to become more self-conscious abou the theoretical para-
digms within which they work. For Connolly an important aspect
of developing such a critical self-conscious capacity is the accom-
panying increase in deliberate choice
:
10
.. Aware now more fully of my habits of classification and inter-pretation, I open myself to new possibilities
. I convert, to someegree, unconsciously acquired predispositions that have condi-loned my thought into more fully conscious constructs What
was a force acting upon me becomes .. .one among alternative
orientations that I can choose to develop, or to alter, or to
reject. And in making conscious a tacit dimension of thought,increase the extent to which my future choices can be influ-
enced by rational argument (1974, p.62). (Emphasis in original.)
As an American living in a capitalist society, I was brought
up in what Connolly calls the "consensus" perspective (also known
varyingly as functionalist, idealist, capitalist). I only became
aware of this tacit world view and how strongly it influenced my
opinions, values, attitudes and choices after exposure to the mate-
rialist view. I have found, as Connolly says, that exposing my
values to alternative theoretical structures has "made conscious a
tacit dimension of thought." By using an opposite paradigm to an-
alyze my own I believe I have become more open to the integration
of the variety of perspectives which are synthesized in this paper
and which may provide groundwork for new directions in edu
cation
.
This study began, I suppose, when I first became aware as
an adolescent struggling with gymnastics that I could perform ac-
tivities heretofore impossible for me, such as climbing ropes and
swinging upsidedown from the rings, by thinking about the parts
of my body and in what order they needed to operate for each ac-
tivity. I did not understand whether applying this method of
thinking was how the athletic kids managed to do everything per-
fectly. I knew simply that it was the only way for me to do gym-
11
nasties. Since then, the possibility of thinking about how I think
and act has entered into my life in various forms: in trying to dis-
cover why mathematics was always difficult; in attempting to control
my temper; in striving to overcome severe anxiety and depression;
in crosscultural training, and as a teacher.
In an of these endeavors the role of subjective knowledge was
evident yet unsung and often inexplicable. While a student and
later while teaching in an experiential graduate program at the
School for International Training in Brattleboro, Vermont, experi-
ences in crosscultural training began to indicate possible explana-
tions for the validity of knowing subjectively. These experiences
and subsequent work training educators in evaluation of nonformal
education programs and in crosscultural communication at the
Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts,
have provided the structure for this study.
Procedures for implementing this study include a synthesis of
personal experiences in adult education
; an investigation of liter-
ature in the fields of education
,
creativity
,
philosophy
,
political
economy, psychology, neuropsychology, neurobiology, and theoret-
ical physics; and the formulation of an explanation and method for
acquiring subjective knowledge based on this synthesis and inves-
tigation
.
Scope - A Framework for Consciousness
In this paper, consciousness is viewed as a process through
which experience is transformed into information and information is
12
transformed into action. Viewed at another level, consciousness is
a process which transforms the cosmic reality of subatomic particles,
waves and fields into the daily reality of objects and experience.
At still another level, we might say that consciousness is what oc-
curs when the particular combination of matter and energy which
constitutes our brain acts upon sensory input (in the form of ener-
gy) and transforms it into a symbolic system with which we can
communicate to others what we have experienced. More simply, con-
sciousness can be viewed as a composite of neurophysical properties
and societal reflections whose interaction enables us to grow and
change
.
In an attempt to simplify what can obviously become a multi-
tude of definitions
,
the following five aspects of consciousness are
presented as a guide for the issues to be dealt with in this paper.
Consciousness, like other living forms, is affected by its com-
position. That is, although we may not choose to define conscious-
ness as simply matter in motion, we can say that consciousness is
affected by the constant fluctuations of energy which characterize
other phenomena of nature. First of all, therefore in constructing
a framework for consciousness, we will consider explanations from
modern physics which include relativity, uncertainty, complemen-
tarity and dissipative structures as guidelines for the nature of
change which can characterize consciousness.
Second, consciousness also is influenced in dialectical fashion
by our interaction with our environment. The illusory function of
13
consciousness translates the energy forms received by our senses
into information which helps us to survive in our environment.
This illusory function, however, sometimes acts to the detriment of
the critical function of consciousness which may be seen as present-
ly being subordinated to the illusory function.
Third, although consciousness may not be limited to the prod-
ucts of brain anatomy and physiology, this study assumes that the
information gleaned from studying how brains work is relevant and
useful in identifying methods for developing critical consciousness.
Hence the study will describe physiological and anatomical mecha-
nisms which have been shown to be or are believed to be related
to the critical function of consciousness
.
Fourth, it is assumed that consciousness is involved in learn-
ing and that learning is enhanced through intuition, a capacity of
the brain for which a physiological basis has been proposed. The
study will describe this capacity for intuition and how it can be
used to enhance the critical function of consciousness.
Fifth and finally
,
self-conscious choice is a capacity which
can be developed through certain skill areas relating to introspec-
tion which curriculum can be designed to include. These skill
areas will be identified and described in detail.
Definition of Terms
Choice Selection among alternatives .
Con sciousness The totality of experience, and a
transformation process
.
14
Critical Consciousness Implies testing one's own per-
ceptions and explanations, re-
jecting passivity
,
accepting
responsibility, becoming the
subject or creator of history,
rather than the object (Freire,
1976); transformation and re-
flection through self-conscious-
ness .
Experience Apprehending nature through
the senses; acting upon nature
and undergoing the consequences
of that action
.
Illusory Consciousness Transformation without self-
consciousness
.
Intuition Access to the totality of con-
sciousness .
Learning Changing through experience;
reflection on that experience.
Self-Consciousness Knowing through reflection or
introspection; internal aware-
ness of physiological signs and
thought patterns. (Subjective
knowing)
Self-Conscious Choice Implies the understanding of con-
sciousness as a changing force,
capable of self-direction; applying
this understanding in thought and
action by attending to one's innate
capacity for choice
.
Summary
A brief background stating the need for the development of
critical consciousness in an industrialized society such as the
United States began this chapter. It concluded by stating the
need for education to emphasize the development of self-conscious
choice to help cut through the illusions which bind our society and
15
promote oppression here and abroad. The problem to be dealt with
ts twofold: a lack of understanding of interactive nature of exper-
ience and learning; and the lack of emphasis on reflective capacity
as a skill for developing critical consciousness.
The description of procedure emphasized an endeavor to be
self-conscious about one’s theoretical framework and to employ an
opposite paradigm to increase one's critical capacity. In this case
the materialist framework was purposefully sought to counter a
tacit idealistic framework. However, the study proposes to suggest
a paradigm which is integrative of a number of frameworks. Final-
ly, five aspects of consciousness were mentioned which will provide
an overall structure for the following presentation. First, conscious
ness is a constantly changing phenomenon, like other aspects of
nature. Second, consciousness is interactive with and influenced
by the environment giving it both an illusory and a critical func-
tion. Third, brain physiology constitutes a basis for understand-
ing the critical function of consciousness. Fourth, intuition is a
reflective capacity of consciousness which enhances our capacity
for critical consciousness. Finally, self-conscious choice can be
developed through practicing skills in introspection.
In the next chapter, we will step back to take a look at the
historical development of certain ideas and practices which cur-
rently affect our notion of consciousness and how we acquire knowl-
edge. This will include looking at how use of the scientific method
evolved. The chapter is primarily concerned with understanding
16
"ways of knowing" and how these have come to be divided into ap-
parently opposing ways, such as inductive and deductive thinking.
The nature of experience and how we can learn from experience is
considered in more depth especially as it relates to developing
skills for critical consciousness. Finally, ideas are presented re-
garding the need for a new paradigm within which to pursue the
development of consciousness.
17
NOTES
...all the molecules of the body are continuously beingbroken down and reformed, and the brain is no exception
o this rule - indeed, the average life of a small moleculein the brain may be a matter of minutes only, while 90percent of the proteins of the brain are broken down and
replaced by new, presumably identical molecules within aperiod of no more than fourteen days or so .
"
From A. Lathja and J. Toth., Biochemical and Biophysical Research
gommunications 23 (1966) 294-sT^uoted in Steven Rose, the Consciousg£aLn (NY: Vintage Books, 1976) p. 243.
2
- In Schooling in Capitalist America (NY: Basic Books, 1976) p.147, Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis provide a detailed analysis of the role
of education in supplying the specific forms of labor required by our
system. "The perpetuation of the class structure requires that the
hierarchical division of labor be reproduced in the consciousness of its
participants. The educational system is one of several reproduction
mechanisms through which dominant elites seek to achieve this ob-jective
.
"
3. Examples where reflective capacity is used and considered
capable of growth and training would be in psychoanalysis (see
Reflection as Science" in Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests
,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, pp . 214-245); in cross-cultural
training (see Batchelder and Warner, Beyond Experience: The Exper-
iential Approach to Cross-Cultural Education
,
Brattleboro: Experiment
Press, 1977); and in group dynamics training (see William R. Torbert,
Learning from Experience: Toward Consciousness
, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1972, pp . 85-100).
4. For definitions of "wholistic" and "reductionist" please see
Steven Rose, The Conscious Brain
,
p. 27.
CHAPTER II
A NEW PARADIGM
And the change in (us) begins with the
change in (our) understanding of the
'meaning of consciousness' and after
that with (our) gradual acquiring
command over it. (16)
P.D. Ouspensky
Introduction
Attempting to say something meaningful and useful about con-
sciousness is akin, at times, to making a long distance telephone
call these days
. There are many connections
,
but no certainties
.
Yet the expanding literature indicates heightened interest from a
wide range of disciplines. And in some cases, albeit a few, we find
some scientist or philosopher willing to suggest a hypothesis for
testing. I am a teacher, and I hope that this discussion of con-
sciousness will in fact suggest hypotheses to be tested by other
teachers
.
Some others have recently written about the brain and educa-
tion (Hart, 1983). This paper is also about the brain and educa-
tion. But it is also about consciousness because it is time for edu-
cation as a science to join its discoveries about human conscious-
ness with, for example, those emerging from neuroscience and
physics. The brain is knowable and consciousness ’commandable'
through self-conscious discipline for which skills can be taught.
18
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Becoming' self-conscious has a number of facets. One of them
concerns being self-conscious (i.e., self-aware rather than nervous)
about one’s paradigm or world view when engaged in research and
writing (Connolly
,
1974). The first section of this chapter is an
attempt at describing certain critical features of a paradigm which
have permeated all of my thinking and education, both formal and
informal, up to the present. Although I believe this same paradigm
has permeated the consciousness of the West in general, the criti-
cal features, or "oppositions" highlighted here have special signifi-
cance for my particular view of consciousness. Their presentation
is not meant to imply a definition of Western thought.
In addition, if I want to practice self-consciousness regarding
paradigms it is important to state that my interest in brain physi-
ology as a basis for designing educational methods stems from an
intuitive regard for certain explanations which are currently called
materialist. Perhaps as the paper progressess, however, an inte-
grative approach will become evident
.
A Short History of Ideas *
This history, as mentioned, is highly selective but may pre-
sent a useful backdrop against which to examine current ideas
about consciousness
. It is assumed here that the history of ideas
is a representation of a type of collective consciousness of Western
society and the United States in particular. To analyze this collec-
tive consciousness we can begin by looking at what peoples' expla-
nations were for why and how things happened in the world. With-
20
m the explanations which arise are contained "oppositional pairs",
for example, materialism and idealism, inductive and deductive
thinking- And from within these pairs a type of synthesis is
derived which may point toward a new paradigm.
Materialism and Idealism
As explanations of why and how things happen in the world
and in the universe, materialism and idealism are usually posed as
opposites and have been posed that way since at least the 6th cen-
tury (500 B.C.). This paper will not attempt to trace these two
concepts m detail from early Greece to the present. What concerns
us is how they shape the world view of their respective proponents
today as well as then, and how this influence affects our own prac-
tice in education and other fields
.
Plato and Aristotle, two familiar bulwarks of one of the main
philosophical traditions of Europe and North America, are given
credit for the explication of early forms of the idealist philosophy.
While Plato attributed the existence of ideas to "divine origin" or
God, Aristotle demurred from divinity to suggest a 'first mover
. . . exempt from all change" (Cameron, 1973, p. 211). Two who
may not be so familiar to us, Democritus and later Lucretius, set
down major points of the materialist explanation
. In about 50 B . C
.
in a work entitled De Rerum Natura (Of the Nature of Things)
Lucretius wrote:
Certainly, the atoms did not post themselves purposefully
in due order by an act of intelligence
,
nor did they stip-
ulate what movements each should perform. But multitudinous
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atoms swept along in multitudinous courses through infinitetune by mutual clashes and their own weight, have come to-gether m every possible way and realized everything that
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by their COmbinatto"s (Cameron, m3
A fairly continuous debate between materialist and idealist
philosophies has persisted through the centuries. In both expla-
nations there is a recognition of something referred to as "matter"
and something referred to as "spirit." As we have noted with
Plato, (according to Cameron) we consist of "...mind and body,
mind being analogous to God, (e.g. spirit) the body to matter"
(p. 209). Lucretius, the Roman materialist who lived some 250
years after Plato, sees it somewhat differently:
There is no dichotomy between body and mind. Mind inter-
acts with the body through an intermediary, a 'vital spirit'
...which gives life and movement to the limbs and veins and
bones. This 'vital spirit,’ like the body, consists of atoms(Cameron quoting De Rerum Natura, p. 215).
It is Plato's interpretation, a world which consists of a divi-
sion between matter and spirit, which has received the stronger
emphasis in Western consciousness. Although he modified this po-
sition somewhat, Aristotle thought that "...Nature has an 'end' or
'goal' always in view and shapes things toward it" (Cameron, 1973,
p. 212). Whether or not Aristotle meant for this "purposeful
Nature" to represent a divine being or God, subsequent philo-
sophical and religious tradition interpreted it that way.
So the idealist view began to take precedence in the con-
sciousness, the philosophy and the practice of Europe. But why
did Aristotle's views have more staying power than Lucretius who
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came after him? Capra suggests that it was a "lack of interest in
the material world" which left the "Aristotelian model of the uni-
verse.
.
.unchallenged for so long" (until the Renaissance) as well
as "the strong hold of the Christian church which supported
Aristotle's doctrines throughout the Middle Ages" (Capra, 1975
, p.
8 ).
But then, we may ask, what caused this lack of interest? In
the preceding- discussion of consciousness it was proposed that
consciousness is, in part, a reflection of society. Thus it is also
important to consider Cameron's suggestion that "...each society
has its own needs in regard to ideas (and) knowledge" (p. 215).
The patterns of society in Greece and Rome at the time and up
until the Renaissance included commercial societies based largely on
slave labor and later, throughout Europe, a strong feudal system.
In Cameron's view, "A feudal society had no more use for the
ideas of Lucretius than it had for the experimental method..." (p.
215). He implies that the dominance of the Christian church both
as a landholder and spiritual guide would naturally have found
materialist ideas heretical and therefore such ideas were not per-
petuated among the educated. And if the uneducated happened to
find themselves thinking about such things
,
social forces were
strong enough to squelch any significant development of those
ideas. Whether one fully supports this interpretation or not,
Europe during the Middle Ages did not yield any significant addi-
tion to the materialist explanation. It is important to remember, in
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any case, that this division between matter and spirit is another
"opposition" which concerns us in understanding consciousness.
Emergence of the Scientific Method
One view of finding out how people tried to explain why
things happen is to consider their answer to the question "Where
does knowledge come from?" (Politzer, 1976). The answer for
Europe for a couple of thousand years was "Knowledge comes from
the mind which is also spirit, God." As we trace the influence of
this choice on the development of human consciousness we next are
concerned with the question "How do things happen?"
With this question we move from the more philosophical "why?"
to the "scientific" (as it came to be known) "how?" Philosophical
inquiry is based on "logical reasoning rather than empirical meth-
ods. " Science is defined as "the observation, identification, de-
scription, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of
natural phenomena." We should also note for later discussion how-
ever, that science is also defined as "knowledge; especially, knowl-
edge gained through experience" (American Heritage Dictionary).
Lincoln Barnett, in a summary of scientific developments, also
suKKes ts that it was Aristotle's tendency to focus on "why" and
his belief that one "could arrive at an understanding of ultimate
reality by reasoning" (1948 p. 15), that influenced the direction of
science toward the spiritual for so many centuries . He concurs
with Cameron and Capra that the Renaissance, a period roughly
lasting from 1300 to 1500, heralded a new turn in science. Euro-
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pean commerce expanded significantly across continents and oceans.
New technologies were required to meet this economic expansion
and simultaneously came a burst of new or revived information about
how things work. The technology required by this great commer-
cial expansion and simultaneous inquiry regarding the motion of
planets, water pressure, magnetism, mining and metallurgy and an
array of other areas (Cameron, 1973, pp . 325-6), led Galileo,
Newton and others to ask how things happen, but in a special way
which had not been generally used since early Greek and Egyptian
thinkers had used it -- through the use of controlled experiments
or what would come to be known as the scientific method.
Another area of scientific endeavor was influenced greatly by
the Renaissance activity
. Mathematics began to be used beyond
the realm of astronomy becoming a major component in the scien-
tific method. Mathematics - "the study of number, form, arrange-
ment, and. . .relationships, using.
. .symbols" - played a very im-
portant role in the development of scientific method because of its
unique function of translating observable phenomena into symbols
which can be manipulated to create logical "proofs." These proofs
can then be demonstrated to conform to established "laws" of
science or can be used to formulate new laws or patterns to de-
scribe how things work. This capability of consciousness to create
and manipulate symbols took on significance as a way of knowing
,
of ascertaining, the certainty of the how of happenings.
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Scientific method has three basic steps: first, gathering ex-
P imental evidence, second, correlating the experimental evidence
with mathematical symbols and then constructing a mathematical
model or theory and using this model to predict results of further
experiments which help to check the accuracy of the model (this
part sometimes referred to as hypothetic - deductive method and
dependent upon the mathematical function described above); and
third, formulating a model in "ordinary language" to explain what
the mathematical scheme has demonstrated (Capra, 1975, pp . 17-18).
On the one hand the universal acceptance in Europe, hence in
our U.S. cultural heritage, of this basic form for scientific inves-
tigation, helped establish a fairly integrated and efficient system
for the production of scientific knowledge. It provided a method
for exploring how things worked and in addition a system for es-
tablishing the fact, proof, or "truth" of an event. This universal
acceptance among both "natural" and "social" scientists led also to
the development of a series of convictions about how fact or truth
is established based on certain "oppositions" which, as we shall
see, may now be a hindrance to a clearer understanding and use
of human consciousness.
Experience Is Not Enough
One of the measures of the complexity of consciousness is ex-
hibited in the number of words we have for describing it. We have
general categories such as thinking, knowing, reflecting, dreaming;
then more specific descriptors such as logic, reason, intuition; and
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stm finer distinctions such as inductive, deductive, objective and
subjective thinking. As people have attempted to clarify how we
know how things happen (i.e.
,
the "proof or certainty of how
things happen) various of these descriptions of what takes place in
conciousness have taken on almost mutually exclusive meanings,
leading us to sedentary rather than creative views of the mind's
potential
.
As noted above, the move from more philosophical explana-
tions to more scientific explanations involved a shift from "logical
reasoning" to "empirical methods." That is, thinking something
through in the head was not as acceptable a proof of an explana-
tion as was an empirical demonstration - an experiment in which
results could be observed, noted down, communicated to others
and compared with previous and subsequent results. An hiatus
between these two forms of acquiring knowledge has developed
over the centuries in an indistinct yet very influential way. Ac-
quiring knowledge through reasoning or thinking alone, that is,
through introspection, through theorizing, became identified as a
subjective method and therefore unverifiable by scientific means...
unless the theory were so constructed as to be able to be tested
by empirical method. Acquiring knowledge empirically, i.e., from
observation or experiment; guided by practical experience and not
by theory" became identified as an objective method, verifiable
through others' experience as well as one's own. In addition to
this dichotomy between reason and practical experience there also
27
emerged some often confusing distinctions between induction and
deduction as ways to know; and between objectivity and subjec-
tivity as characteristics of knowing, and about the nature of ex-
perience in general.
Deductive and Inductive Thinking
Although very little has been revealed to us about the brain’s
processes until recent years, there are some compelling aspects
about how we think that philosophers and scientists have agreed
on using introspection as proof rather than observable phenomena.
The Greeks of Aristotle's time and possibly others before them dif-
ferentiated between inductive and deductive thinking. Aristotle
was a proponent of the deductive process - assuming a general
principle and deriving particular points from it (Cameron, 1973
, p.
211, Barnett, 1948, p. 15). Socrates on the other hand is famous
for his inductive arguments, deriving general principles from the
investigation of particular points (Cameron, p. 210).
Since that time, philosophers and scientists have taken very
definite positions on which type of thinking leads to the acquisition
of knowledge. With Rennaissance discoveries came Francis Bacon
who postulated, in the late 1500's, that
The induction which is to be available for the discovery
and demonstration of sciences and arts must analyze nature
by proper rejections and exclusions .. .Matter
,
rather than
forms.
. .should be the object of our attention, its con-
figuration and changes of configuration, and simple action,
and laws of action or motion; for forms are figments of the
human mind unless you will call those laws of action forms
(Cameron, p. 336).
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Bacon was convinced that useful explanations were to be derived
from observing matter in motion and its laws, a fairly straight-
forward materialist position rather than "forms" here taken to mean
ideas. He suggests observing the myriad actions and changes of
matter in order to formulate laws — an inductive approach.
Rene Descartes, born 30 years after Bacon, contributed sub-
stantially to the development of scientific knowledge, primarily
through his work in mathematics (geometry) and philosophy
. He
was a firm protagonist of the deductive approach, emphasizing that
he must exercise doubt regarding anything of which he "had been
convinced of only by example and custom" (Miller, 1981, p. 190,
quoting from Discours de la Methode, 1637). David Hume, a phi-
losopher of the early to mid 18th century, took a stronger position
regarding the primacy of "reason" (deductive thinking) over "cus-
tom" (inductive thinking) (MiHer, 1981, p. 8).
The struggle to establish the primacy of one or the other of
these types of thinking, was, after all, the struggle of philoso-
phers to ascertain exactly how the mind knows or how it grasps
reality
,
to paraphrase Cameron (p . 339) . Accompanying this de-
bate about the process of consciousness was another debate about
the structure of consciousness. That is, from Plato to Locke to
Kant there was a debate over the contents of the mind at birth.
Plato believed that the mind or consciousness was an extension of
God and contained ideas at birth. Locke presented consciousness
as a 'blank tablet' at birth with "capacities and instincts, but no
ideas" (Cameron, p. 339).
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However, in the work of Immanuel Kant, towards the end of
the 18th century, especially his Critique of Pure Reason a sub-
stantial change can be noted in the view of the oppositional nature
of these two "types" of thinking. Kant rejected the blank tablet
idea and added to his picture of consciousness elements of time,
space and causality which have special significance for the ensuing
discussion of our capacity for critical consciousness. Cameron de-
scribes Kant as regarding the mind
...as a set entity with its own inherent laws... In these "laws"
o
frmS °f "Cate£°ries "> the essence of his answeru e and to Locke. The mind is not a blank tablet at birthbut possesses frameworks into which it places the knowledge
which it acquires. Among these (categories) are time, space,and causality. Time and space have no objective existence butare simply ways in which the mind digests what the senses
reveal to it. There is causality, but it is an internal, not an
external phenomenon (p . 342).
In addition to the idea that the mechanism for understanding
time and space were inherent in the mind, Kant delved deeply into
what Robert Miller, a neuroscientist, has recently referred to as
"varieties of inference." Kant identified what he called "synthetic
statements" which were the result of inclusive thinking or infer-
ence, and "analytic statements which resulted from deductive infer-
ence (Miller, 1981, p. 187-8). Kant's detailed analysis of the ex-
amples and progression of these conscious processes have, through
Miller's analysis, yielded two points significant for this study. The
first is that Kant indicates that both inductive and deductive infer-
ence can have similar origins in process, that is, they can both be
of the "a priori" or non-empirical type requiring no new information
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from the outside but rather based on that
..stored in the past,"
«.e., subjective knowledge) (Miller, p. 188)
. Second
_
Kant , s
treatment of these processes requires attention to the prospect
that conscious ability to recognize spatial and temporal patterns
may be a function peculiar to inclusive or inductive thinking
(Miller, p. 187 ).
Kant's perceptions help to bring some order to the confusion
about inductive and deductive thinking. The issue need not be
which is more reliable than the other, but what similarities and dif-
ferences they have as processes of consciousness and, how they
can be used. A similarity, as stated above, is that both can make
use of knowledge already in the head (instead of deduction always
depending on newly observed information). A difference is that
deductive thinking tends to be analytical, picking out details
,
while
inductive thinking synthesizes details.
These distinctions bring to mind those which have lately been
identified as "left" and "right" brain functions, the deductive cor-
responding to left brain activities and inductive to right brain ac-
tivities. (We will refer to the right/left model in more detail later.)
Mainly, however, the deductive/inductive distinction can be viewed
as, perhaps, an unconscious recognition of the illusory and critical
functions (respectively) of consciousness. Deducing from an as-
sumed principle corresponds to the way in which our illusory con-
sciousness allows us to operate from day to day on basic (usually
unconscious) assumptions about our reality. Inducing or gathering
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together many particuiars (from the whole store of our knowledge)
corresponds to the wholistic critical function which can permit new
perspectives. A further connection between these two types of
thinking and the ideas of space and time, and causality, will be
discussed in Chapter III.
In the long run, as Robert Miller suggests, "...deduction and
induction should interact in a subtle and delicate balance" (1981,
P- 191). In order to achieve such a balance we need to be aware,
self-conscious, of how we personally make use of these functions.
Subjectivity and Objectivity
The foregoing discussion on the validity of two apparently con
trasting ways of acquiring knowledge leads us almost inevitably to
consider another distinction between a pair of "opposing" aspects
of knowing: the subjective aspect and the objective aspect. Ori-
gins for this historical opposition can be found in as well in the
prolific musings of Rene Descartes. The body, for Descartes, was
"...a machine driven by a hydraulic system of vital liquids cours-
ing down the nerves.
.
." and this system was driven by the soul.
The soul resided in a tiny organ (the pineal gland) and was sep-
arate from both the brain and the nervous system (Rose, 1976, p.
39). This dualism, of mind (soul) and brain survives in many cur-
rent explanations of consciousness
.
Capra believes that Descartes' "fundamental division between
the I and the world" (1975, p. 45), solidified for the next few cen-
turies the ideas that cause and effect could be determined for "all
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the forces acting in nature" in LaPlace' words. Therefore, ac-
cording to Descartes, the material universe is predictable and
totally separate from the human observer. Hence "the world could
be described objectively.
. .and such an objective description of na-
ture became the ideal of all science" (Capra, p. 45).
In fact, the use of these concepts - subjectivity and objectiv-
ity
-are so common in our everyday communication it is very diffi-
cult to set them apart and analyze them. To "take an objective
viewpoint" or to "speak subjectively" about a topic are phrases we
use and postures we try to assume regularly in our daily inter-
changes with people. But what does it mean to be subjective or
objective? Subjective usually connotes something personal or in-
dividual. It also is defined as "existing only in the mind" "unaf-
fected by the external world" and "illusory." These seem familiar
synonyms. In psychology the term is somewhat more specific.
Generally something subjective is to psychologists (and others)
something that exists only "within the experiencer's mind and in-
capable of external verification." However, it is also important to
note the first, i.e., most acceptable, definition: "Pertaining to
the real nature of something; essential."
Objective has a similar range of opposite meanings: "of or
having to do with a material object as distinguished from a mental
concept, idea, or belief; having actual existence or reality; unin-
fluenced by emotion, surmise, or personal prejudice; based on ob-
servable phenomena, presented factually.
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These dictionary definitions help us to see how objectivity
came to be associated with the experimental method as the scien-
tific way to view things while subjectivity has come to be under-
stood, as the psychologist's definition above, as something not ex-
ternally verifiable, i.e., not scientific or not as valid a way of
knowing as the experimental method.
The distinction between objective and subjective ways of know-
ing parallels that between deductive and inductive inference
.
2 Ob-
jective knowledge is factual, demonstrable to others through a gen-
erally accepted mode (scientific method) or immediate sensory verifi-
cation ("That fire engine over there is red."). Participants in the
exchange of objective knowledge share in the experience and can
agree within accepted parameters on what they observe or sense.
Subjective knowledge is opinion, demonstrable through verbal or
visual description and upon which participants may not agree about
what is observed or sensed ("I think it's going to rain."). Occa-
sionally an experience occurs when participants do not agree on
what ought to be an objective bit of information, for example "I
love that green car!" "Which one? Oh, that's a blue car, I like
it too . "
This last example reminds us that knowledge is obtainable
through experience and that experience is mediated (made possi-
ble) by the senses. A basic unity underlying both objective and
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subjective knowledge
cussing this "duality"
(i.e.
, experience vs.
resides m this physiological fact. In dis-
which pervades our investigation of knowing
observation, induction vs. deduction, objec-
tive information vs. subjective information) Robert MUler stresses
that knowing something subjectively, through introspection, is a
necessary part of making an objective assessment. "AH objective
observations depend on the existence of an observing subject and
(his/her) capacity to form subjective impressions” ( 1980
,
p. 11).
People can agree on the objective certainty of an experience only
after they have made their personal and subjective assessment.
And this assessment is based on experience as a process of con-
sciousness
.
The Call for Unity and the Recognition of Intuition
If we can accept that observing is an experience, that induc-
tive and deductive thinking are complementary processes, that sub-
jectivity supports objectivity, the differentiation between those
"oppositions" becomes almost semantical. We have accepted that
one type of thinking leads to certainty and the other to specula-
tion. Yet the definition of certainty and the rules by which cer-
tainty is obtained have also been agreed upon by individuals, in
their personal, subjective capacity. This individual capacity for
accepting and defining certainty underlies a very significant and
very poorly understood capacity of consciousness which, in turn,
links these oppositional modes at a subconscious level. This uni-
fying capacity of consciousness is otherwise called intuition.
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A great deal has been written in the past two decades about
the respective functions of right and left sides of the brain
(Ornstem, 1968). Very roughly it has become popular to link ana-
lytical capacities with the left hemisphere and intuitive capacities
with the right hemisphere. Recent research has shown the two
hemispheres to be a great deal more interactive that was originally
thought, however it is also generally agreed that our intuitive
"side” is, for most people, not as well developed as the analytical
(Hart, 1983). John Eccles, a prominent English neurobiologist
whose research on cellular functions in the brain is basic text
around the world, and others, refer regularly in their work to the
left brain hemisphere as the "dominant" and the right hemisphere
as the "minor" (1977; Luria, 1973).
The interactive nature of the two hemispheres has been empha-
sized in research which suggests a "lexical organization" in the right
hemisphere which supplements the left hemisphere's language mecha-
nisms (Zaidel, 1977). In addition, Eran Zaidel's further research at
the California Institute of Technology showed that when patients
who had use of only one hemisphere were asked to perform the same
task, the basic difference between hemispheres was not one of "fi-
nal competence but one of performance style" (1977, p. 283). There-
fore it is likely that the left-right distinction is useful more for
description of the complex arrangement of consciousness than for
actual physiological identification.
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Another way of viewing the apparent separation of brain func-
through the ’triune” brain theory proposed by Paul MacLean
(1973). This theory proposes that the human brain consists of three
totally integrated areas but with each area having a different evolu-
tionary role. The reptilian brain, the earliest to form in mammals
and a holdover from our reptilian ancestors, is generally responsible
for the basic regulation of bodily functions and the condition of
readiness or wakefulness at any one time. The limbic system, pres-
ent in aU mammals, appears to be what MacLean refers to as nature’s
attempt at a "respectable cortex” or "thinking cap" for the reptilian
brain "...giving the mammal a better picture for adapting to its
internal and external environment" (1973, p. 12). The limbic system,
as we shah see later, plays an important role in regulating emotions,
especially in terms of self-preservation and preservation of the
species (MacLean, p. 12).
The third portion of this triune picture is the "new mammalian
brain or the neocortex which is the large uppermost portion of
the brain enfolding the other two (please see Figure 5) . This por-
tion of the brain is responsible for the processing and storage of
information and the ability to both remember and plan. It is this
area of the brain which is most fully developed in humans and to
which most of the discussion of physiology in this paper will relate.
In his description of these outer hemispheres, Luria makes a dis-
tinction between the posterior portion which analyzes, codes and
stores information and the frontal or anterior portion which forms
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Figure 5: Brain
(Adapted from Bob Conrad)
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"intentions
25).
and programs,” (please see Figure 4a) (Luria, 1972, p.
Our intuitive capacity is linked most directly with this third
portion of the "triune” brain. The abilities to plan, to take inten-
tional action, to formulate, follow, and reformulate programs (such
as driving to work by a certain route) all rely on the billions of
nerve cells of various species which make up this part of the brain.
In this study, intuition is viewed in part as a capacity of conscious-
ness which assists in a special kind of retrieval of information from
this vast area where the brain stores its knowledge.
A direct link is suggested between the intuitive capacity of
the brain and our capacity for obtaining certainty through induc-
tive and subjective ways of knowing. However this does not mean
to suggest, in the oppositional style described above, that intuition
is separate from objective and deductive ways of knowing. This is
a serious call for understanding consciousness in holistic fashion.
Subjective and inductive modes will be emphasized because their
minor position has seriously inhibited the development of intui-
tive capacity in individuals in our society (Hart, 1976, Bastick,
1982).
We have stated that we learn from experience but that some-
how, as society has developed, "experience" was not enough to con-
vince us, experience as interpreted by the individual did not hold
enough certainty to be considered a valid base for knowledge on
its own
. Experience is the base from which we know all that we
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know Experience is the base from which we become all that we
become. In this next section we will consider the interactive,
dialectical nature of experience and its significance for the devel-
opment of critical consciousness
.
The Nature of Experience
Separating Reason from Experience
The foregoing pages have outlined the progression of Western
thinkers toward the development and use of a method of acquiring
knowledge that is considered to be essentially deductive in approach,
that requires experimentation based on agreed format, and that as-
sumes this experimental process to result in the collection of data
that is verified and acceptable because it is replicable by numerous
other people through similar experiments. This method, as we have
said, is thus, firmly grounded in a concept of "objectivity" implying
that the experimenter or scientist, the observer, is and remains
outside the activity of the experiment, having no effect but to record
results
.
August Comte, living in the first half of the 19th century,
made substantial contribution to systematizing this method, not only
for the natural sciences but for the social sciences as well. His
belief was that all knowledge had to be based on the "positive" data
of experience in order to be considered fact. This Positivist ap-
proach is dominant in scientific inquiry today. For those of us
who celebrate experience as the key to knowledge, such an ap-
proach should hold no difficulty. There is a difficulty, however,
and it arises as we explore what is meant by experience.
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The scientific method outlined above assumes that the experi-
ence from which knowledge or fact is being obtained is what
goes on before the_eyes of the observer (the scientist). The scien
tist's observation of this experience which is external to him or
her is then recorded symbolically (in mathematics or words) and
becomes after significant replication, objective fact. The experi-
ence of the instruments, animals, people, subatomic particles and
whatever else might be involved in a variety of types of experi-
ments are said to be unaffected by the observer, thus the re-
corded results have a validity of their own, external to the ob-
server of the experiment.
One outcome of this view of acquiring valid knowledge about
something was that it became impossible for introspection to be a
method for learning and knowing, at least in the universally ac-
cepted sense of the 'objective' method described above. Thinking
about one’s own inner processes became a subjective enterprise,
not verifiable by others and therefore not useful in general to soci-
ety. Any subjective' data gathered through thinking something
through in the head was not really measurable, not really collect-
ible data, and therefore, could not be accepted as proof for a
statement resulting from the introspection or thinking. Michael
Polanyi has termed this the "separation of reason from experience"
(1958, p. 9). It is a major premise of this paper that thinking
about how we acquire knowledge is an integral part of any educa-
tional curriculum. Each learner, as he or she becomes more self-
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conscious about how he or she learns, develops the capacity to
am all the more. Hence, the use of 'subjective' knowledge, the
exercise of introspection as a learning skill, becomes of primary
importance in education
.
In order for this to happen, however, definitions of what is
valid experience, what is valid information, will have to undergo
major adjustments in our Western scientific paradigm. My own ex-
perience of what goes on inside my mind has, in some way, to be
accepted as fact rather than illusion. If we recall the definition of
subjective stated above "pertaining to the real nature of things;
essential" - it is this understanding which needs to become popular.
Experience Changes Us
To begin, it is helpful to consider Karl Marx' concept of human
beings as being "sensuous" in nature. A very important part of
our humanness he says, is contained in our "essential powers"
(Tucker, 1972, p.75). These powers or capacities (Oilman, 1971,
p . 74)
,
he divides into two types : natural and species
. Our nat-
ural powers are those we share with other animals in an obvious
way: laboring, eating and drinking, and sexual relations (Oilman,
p . 83) . Our species powers are those which may make us somehow
different from other animals - "seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting,
feeling, thinking, being aware. . .wanting, acting, loving. . ."
(Tucker
,
p. 73). These species powers Marx often refers to as
senses
,
hence the primary importance of our sensuous nature.
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So if we are to take this as a model to help us better use and
understand consciousness, we can say that human beings have cer-
tain "natural" capacities which enable us to carry on life as all other
living creatures do. However, we also are "species" beings or
"sensuous" beings with special faculty or ability not only to see,
hear, smell, taste, and feel, but also possessing what Marx some-
times referred to as "mental senses" enabling us to think, be a-
ware, want, act, and love among others. Such designations are
not out of the ordinary, of course. What is special about Marx'
conception of human nature is the relationship he ascribes between
our powers or senses and the world outside each of us. To des-
cribe this relationship Marx refers to us as objective beings or
beings who are "... affirmed in the objective world not only in the
act of thinking, but with all (our) senses" (Tucker, p . 74)
.
Oilman helps us to understand this type of affirmation by ex-
plaining that for each power or sense that we have, Marx posits a
corresponding need through which we become aware of that par-
ticular power or sense. This need, in turn, implies a need for an
'object' and that this object is "necessary for (the) realization" of
the power or sense (Oilman p. 76). The power to eat, for ex-
ample, corresponds to a need - hunger - for an object or ob-
jects - food - which exist outside the body (Oilman p. 88). If we
use this same example with another power, or in this case, a sense,
the power of sight corresponds to a need - to see - for recognizing
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objects external to us
. The sense of sight is realized through the
need to see. The power of eating is realized through the need of
hunger. These human faculties or abilities come to be throng
action. Our senses become refined as we use them, as we engage
them in experience
.
And once again, what is experience? "...the apprehension of
an object... through the use of the senses..."4 Experiencing is
taking the essence of something - it’s light, shadow, sound, vol-
ume, substance - into ourselves and, through consciousness, trans-
forming this object into thoughts, and possibly, communications with
others. Now how do we "take the essence of something" in? Some-
times we do this by using the senses in straightforward form -
looking, feeling, smelling, etc. At other times we take in the es-
sence of something when we act upon it to change it in some way,
as in felling a tree, making a cake, or putting paint on canvas.
Experience also involves us interacting with other people; and it
also involves us interacting with ourselves through thinking,
through introspection
.
Experience is apprehending. Marx uses the term appropriat-
ing -we in some way make what we appropriate a part of ourselves
(Oilman, p. 89). This aspect of experience holds the key to the
development of consciousness
. When we experience something in
any of the ways mentioned, the senses or powers which we use in
doing so are affected, are changed in some way. No, our eyes do
not change perhaps, but the parts and processes of our brain
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which allow vision to occur do change as a result of each visual
experience. This change has a psychological and a physiological
nature both of which are knowable, the former through introspec-
tion and the latter trhough the objectivity of technology.
The Dialectic of Experience
We have said that we are changed when we act upon nature.
Our conscious processes help to "appropriate" the objects of our
action, thereby bringing about change in us, change of which we
can become aware. This is the basis of learning.
There is, however, an inescapable paradox, or contradiction
if you will, about our relationship to each other and the rest of
nature. Nature changes as we act upon it by felling trees, plowing
earth and building parking lots. But nature also changes as we
observe it, as we act upon it with our senses. This idea is not
new to those who study perception and attention and find evidence
that we are very selective in what and how we take information in.
But the idea that we actually change something by looking at it
has been demonstrated most graphically by research in the field of
quantum physics
.
In 1927
,
Werner Heisenberg was attempting to measure both
the position and velocity of an electron. According to Newtonian
theory measuring speed and position of a moving object is quite
normal. Since an electron can only be made visible by using high
frequency gamma rays, bombarding the electron in order to observe
its position will effect both velocity and position of the electron
.
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It is possible to adjust the gamma rays so that one or the other
property can be measured more exactly, but always to the detri-
ment of measuring the other. If position becomes more exact,
velocity changes all the more. This discovery is referred to as
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. But why should this affect
anything- beyond looking at electrons?
Because of Heisenberg's discovery, physicists have had to ac-
cept the fact that they, as scientists, as observers of the experi-
ments they conduct, do, after all, have an effect on the experiment
itself. The experience they are observing is part of their own exper
lence
. In this case, the light (gamma ray) that is projected onto
the electron was necessary for Heisenberg's own visual process.
Yet this element directly affected the object being observed (the
electron). The observer's experience became a part of the elec-
tron s movement. Put another way, experimental observation of an
object involved the observer in interaction with that object through
the mechanism of sight which itself is a transformation of light ener-
gy • For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of quantum phys-
ics, please see "Shedding Light on The Subject" in the Appendix.
It is interesting to note, however, that this discovery did not
cause experiments in physics to come to a grinding halt, searching
for another method
. The reality of the situation became that physi-
cists could only measure the probability of the position of a particle,
that is, its tendency toward one position and away from another
(Zukav, 1979, p. 66).
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The fact that observation of an event could affect that event
has not prevented physicists from making remarkable and useful
discoveries. In fact, it seems to be pushing them to frontiers
which seem almost beyond comprehension, at least for Western
minds. For the purpose of understanding consciousness, both this
validation of the observer's experience and the acceptance of a sub-
jective participation in an event which is considered a scientific
method of obtaining knowledge, are highly significant.
Self-Consciousness Through Reflection
The validation of subjective experience which can be gained
from attention to the phenomenon occurring in experiments in
modern physics is central to the approach to learning taken in this
paper. The neurobiological term for learning is "plasticity" which
Timothy Teyler says "...implies a change in some aspect of the nerv
ous system as a function of experience..." (1978, Preface page).
Evidence that physiological changes occur in brain cells as a result
of experience and the possibility for awareness of this change are
basic to the study
. This does not imply that we are able to or
need to sense cellular change directly (although this may be possi-
ble) but that the mental or psychological aspects of this change
are knowable to us
.
John Dewey looks at the dialectical interaction of our relation-
ship to nature as involving two elements: acting or "trying" and
experiencing or "undergoing . " "When we experience something we
act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo
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the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does
something to us in return..." (1916, p. 139). However, as refer-
red to in Chapter I, Dewey believes that experience does not have
meaning, does not constitute learning, unless accompanied by re-
flection. "Reflection.
. .is the discernment of the relation between
hat we try to do and what happens in consequence" (p. 1445).
This "discernment" of the dialectical happening of experience
is the key to developing selfconsciousness
. To be self-conscious
is to exercise the capacity to reflect upon how we change nature
and how we are changed by our action upon nature. And this
capacity can be developed through awareness and skill training.
A Paradigm for Consciousness
To be self conscious is to know oneself in order to be more
conscious, to "know with others" in a more meaningful way. The
fuU development of each individual's potential is dependent upon
interaction with others. Consciousness is a reflection of that inter-
action and of our interaction, our experience, with all of nature.
To be selfconscious is to be aware of our experience and the dia-
lectical changes involved in that experience. Awareness comes to
us as energy through the senses and is mediated or transformed
by the brain to provide us with knowledge. To understand con-
sciousness better (to become more self-conscious) we must use
these same senses and this same mediator: the only way we have
of knowing more about consciousness is through consciousness it-
5
self
. This is the self-mediated nature of humanity
.
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This chapter has outlined the historical development of a mode
of gaining knowledge, the positivist mode, which through its lack
of attention to subjective knowing makes the development of self-
consciousness, hence the growth of consciousness an underdevel-
oped phenomenon. Scientific events of the current century, how-
ever, have brought about a recognition by some that stronger em-
phasis must be placed on the subjective aspect of knowing. The
perspective is growing
,
beyond its usual proponents in the fields
of psychoanalysis and creativity, that the "...internal, conscious,
introspective experience is as valuable a source of science as is
external physical measurement" (Kornhuber, 1977, p. 323). By
neuroscientists (Kornhuber, 1977; Miller, 1981; Pribram, 1980),
chemists (Prigogine, 1980), physicists (Capra, 1975), psychologists
(Bruner, 1971; Davidson and Davidson, 1980) and educators (Freire,
1973; Hart, 1976) a concern of longstanding is being voiced ever
more clearly
.
If Thomas Kuhn's premise is to be believed, paradigms come
and go but with considerable stress on systems of gaining and trans-
ferring knowledge. There is a change in paradigm approaching,
according to authors cited above and some, for example, Brian Fay,
believes that the shift can result in the development of a "critical
social science" which recognizes, among other things, that "...a
great deal of what people do to one another is not the result of
conscious knowledge and choice..." and that is "built on the ex-
plicit recognition that social theory is connected with social prac-
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tice..." and that practice can yield action in the interests of
people's felt needs (Fay, 1975, p.94). Of particular relevance for
this study are the developments in phenomenology and hermeneutics
(Fay, p. 67) which have come forward to suggest readjustment in
the positivist approach.
]1 ?rVee”S that a genUine Synthesis is in the makingin which the foundations of the social sciences will be present
(Fay
m
p
U
68)
radiCaUy different from the Positivist moded
. .
In seeking a new paradigm we are concerned with both the
link between theory and practice which Fay emphasizes and with
the paradigm's approach to how knowledge is acquired. In a para-
digm which supports the development of critical consciousness a
guiding social theory would create expectations for people acting
through self-conscious choice regarding their daily lives. In turn,
such expectation would require a companion expectation for equal
access to the means of acquiring knowledge. In this case "means"
implies not only the social and political access but the personal
physiological and mental "means" as well. Such a critical social
science would seek systems providing nutrition, health care, and
stimulating educational environments for all citizens.
"The Evolutionary Vision"
There is, among natural and social scientists alike, a growing
belief in an "evolutionary vision" - a unifying paradigm which could
explain physical, biological and "sociocultural" evolution (Janstch
,
1980) . The research concerns of people contributing to this vision
have direct links with the view of consciousness presented in this
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Foremost among these are the "self-organization paradigm"
characterized by the Nobel prize winning work of Ilya Prigogine on
pative structures, and the proposed holographic structure of
memory being developed by Karl Pribram.
The framework for consciousness proposed at the end of Chap-
ter I suggested that consciousness is a transformation process under
going constant change itself and characterized by an interactive,
dialectical connection with nature yielding, over time, both a crit-
ical and illusory function. In contrast to the closed system of earli-
er thermodynamic discovery, the dissipative structure is an "open
system" which maintains its own structure by continually exchang-
ing and transforming energy from its environment (Ferguson, 1980).
T he framework for consciousness also proposed that brain physiol-
ogy constitutes a basis for understanding our capacity for self-
consciousness choice. Karl Pribram's research has identified mech-
anisms which he believes to be responsible for self-conscious inten-
tional capacity (Pribram, in Davidson, 1980, p. 51).
Other principles are contained in the evolutionary paradigm
which correspond to the framework proposed here. In Jantsch's
words certain aspects of the evolutionary vision will have "pro-
found epistemological consequences for Western thinking." For ex-
ample :
One of these aspects concerns a basic nondualistic attitude
which is more or less new in Western culture. With it age-
old dichotomies may be overcome, such as the dichotomies
between nature and culture, the natural and the artificial,
mind and matter, observer and observed, subjective and
objective, collective and individual, and others (Jantsch,
1980, p. 4).
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This paradigm will also be strongly influenced by the ideas of
the subjective nature of space and time derived from Einstein's
Special Theory of Relativity; by the uncertainty principle de-
scribed earlier; and by Niels Bohr's concept of complementarity
which takes into account the contradictory or "complementary"
particle/wave phenomena of light, for example, and states that
both views must and can be held together (Blackburn, 1973, p.
28). Consideration of these principles when investigating con-
sciousness has opened up vast reaches within the brain:
...there is speculation, and some evidence, that consciousness,
at the most fundamental levels, is a quantum process. The dark-
adapted eye, for example, can detect a single photon. If this is
so then it is conceivable that by expanding our awareness to in-
clude functions which normally lie beyond its parameters (the
way yogis control their body temperature and pulse rate) we can
become aware of (experience) these processes themselves (Zukav,
1979, p. 222).
The End of Prehistory
A critical social science would I believe find roots in the
Marxian tradition
. Marx stated that it is not our consciousness
that determines our being but, on the contrary, our social being
which determines our consciousness (Marx, 1972, p . 4) . In this
sense consciousness is a reflection of society's patterns. However,
we have also seen that consciousness and action (through exper-
ience) are interwoven through our capacity for self-consciousness,
for reflection.
This interwoven character, a dialectical nature, is seen both
in the concept of dissipative structures and the "unity of oppo-
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sites” 6 predicted as the "relationship of subject and object”
(Brenman- Gibson, 1973, p. 330), reach a new stage.
I would like to suggest that this oppositional character is part
of a 'pattern' that will arise whenever human consciousness is active.
This pattern is dialectical and therefore involves the interaction of
opposite forces (arguments) which, when they interact, their inter-
action implies a progression of forces (ideas) along a particular path.
A theory of dialectical movements in history is not new. What I
propose to be new, however, is the linking of this dialectical pro-
cess in the social sphere to a similar dialectical process in the human
brain
.
Perceiving the elements of our day-to-day lives in their totality
requires a new kind of attention, a challenging paradigm which in-
cludes the workings of the brain and the workings of society. The
inherent antagonisms between the possessing and the non-possessing
classes can be studied to reveal explanations of the limit- situations
we cannot see through. As well, the traditional antagonisms between
student and teacher
,
between liberating and oppressing educational
structures, can be analyzed and changed. The natural physiological
tendency which allows our illusions to remain and dominate can be
overcome through the growth and practice of self-conscious choice.
We may then begin to leave this prehistory and enter the actual
historical period of humankind where history is consciously con-
trolled and created by people in community.
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An_Era for Critical Consciou Sn PSS
Finally
,
this paradigm promotes the development of a people
who are critically conscious, who are no longer "submerged in the
historical process" as objects but become the subjects of history,
its creators (Freire, 1973, p. 17-18). Through a pedagogy which
recognizes the stages of consciousness 7 he delineates and the em-
powering structure proposed by Kindervatter (1979) we can become
praxis. Through reflection and action which truly transform reality
we discover and become the source of knowledge and creation (Freire,
1970).
Summary of the Chapter
We have taken a look at some of the major explanations of how
the world works, in particular those that have survived to influence
our present day Western consciousness. We have also noted the
rise of a particular method of acquiring- knowledge, the scientific
method, which has also superceded certain other possible methods.
In the rush and tumble of dialogue and activity which has produced
our current positivist focus, certain "oppositional" entities were
identified for their significance in understanding consciousness.
For brevity we can list them this way:
Ways of Knowing
Thinking through (in-the-head) Empirical evidence
Direct experience of phenomena Observation and re-
cording of phenomena
Inductive thinking Deductive thinking
Subjectivity Objectivity
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In addition, certain propositions were put forth regarding the
relationship of experience to the development of consciousness em-
phasizing especially the Marxian concept of human sensuous nature
and the dialectical nature of our action on and with objects. This
action, both physical and psychological was proposed as the "sub-
stance" which makes self-conscious reflection possible. The role of
intuition in establishing certainty and providing a unifying function
for consciousness was presented.
Finally
,
a paradigm for the development of critical consciousness
was described linking the idea of the brain as a dissipative structure
to its wholistic intuitional capacity and ability to cut through illusion
to recognize choices. In the next chapter we will look more deeply
at our capacity for choice as an aspect of intuition and its proposed
physiological base.
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CHAPTER Hi
INTUITION, CHOICE, AND CONSCIOUS UNITY
Introduction
In 1890 William James wrote:
Bodily experiences, therefore, and more particularly brain-experiences must take a place amongst those conditions ofhe mental life of which Psychology need take account. The
spiritualist and the associationist (psychologist) must both
—
cerebralists ,' to the extent at least of admitting that
certain peculiarities in the way of working of their ownfavorite principles are explicable only by the fact that thebrain laws are a codeterminant of the result (Ornstein
1968, p . 9)
.
Although James saw the importance of the brain and its activ-
ities for understanding human behavior, actual study of the "brain
laws" is only now, 100 years later, beginning to present itself in a
concrete way. In the early 1900's the behavioral school of psychol-
ogy was establishing itself and would maintain a dominant position
at least until World War II (Davidson, 1980, p. 13). Very much in
the positivist mode, behaviorism focused only on "...aspects of be-
havior which were observable and measurable..." contributing, in
Davidson's words, "enormously to the improvement in the rigor with
which psychological problems were approached and (helping to)
place psychology on firmer ground with respect to its scientific
status" (p . 1213). At the same time, however, this focus on the
measureable aspects of behavior deliberately excluded questions of
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consciousness and other . ,internal mental events" (Davidson p. 13)
which might require an introspective approach.
Following World War II, various methodological and technolog-
ical developments shifted the focus toward concern with internal
mechanisms of the body's neurological/biological systems. The abil-
ity to trace electrical activity in the brain through use of the elec-
troencephalogram CEEG) and the more recent development of the
electron microscope have aU contributed to the new burst of energy
devoted to studying the brain.
Frequently the question is asked, why study the brain? Is it
necessary to understand brain physiology to teach better, to learn
better? Of course I believe the answer is yes. If for the moment
we consider the brain to be a tool of learning it follows that the
better we know how to use the tool the better we learn. Because
many have believed that it was not possible to know about the inner
workings of consciousness the study of consciousness has either
been disregarded (by the behaviorists) or considered the realm of
philosophers. Few of us in education have sought to delve into
the brain to inform our teaching methods because information was
scattered, partly unintelligible in the language of neuroscience,
and not absolutely necessary to our daily teaching.
Today information on the brain is becoming more widely avail-
able in a form possible to be digested by those of us without formal
science background (Rose, 1976). Furthermore, the focus in neuro-
physiology is, increasingly
,
to study the whole brain and its work-
58
mgs rather than, as in the past, to focus on the individual chemical
and electrical mechanisms of a single nerve cell. Aleksandr Luria,
the renowned Soviet pioneer in neuropsychology said in 1973, "It
is the work of the brain as an apparatus organizing human mental
activity which must be of the most immediate concern to the philos-
opher and psychologist, the teacher and physician" (p. 342). Cross-
fertilization among disciplines in the "hard" sciences is yielding con-
vincing evidence for viewing- the brain as a complex of "highly or-
ganized systems" (Thompson, Patterson, and Berger 1978, p. 85)
(Kornhuber, 1977, p. 330) which contribute to learning and memory.
The science of teaching has much to share and much to gain from
joining in this interdisciplinary burst of energy. The cost of not
knowing how best we learn has already been too g'reat (Hart, 1983,
p. 19; Shor, 1980; Tobias, 1978).
Studying the Brain
The attempt to understand the workings of the brain has pro-
duced a series of models or paradigms. These paradigms, suggests
Stephen Rose, were often reflective of the strongest current of sci-
entific thinking at the time. For example, Descartes' picture of
the brain as an hydraulic mechanism fit closely with prevailing
Newtonian concepts of the mechanical workings of the world. Dur-
the 1800's this system was refined into the "localization" idea
of "phrenologists" who proposed that by studying the skull they
could pinpoint areas of the brain responsible for such things as
caution, destructiveness, self-esteem and that these areas were sep-
arate compartments, still in a mechanical mode.
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Rose describes the switch from this compartmentalised model
where every brain function had its home to, in the 1920's, a signal
system much like the telegraph or telephone. He cites a whole sec-
tion from a children's encyclopedia of the late 1930's which describes
the brain as the "executive branch of a big business with a General
Manager (your Conscious Self) and many departments connected by
telephone lines (Rose, 1976, p. 43 ).
For a time cybernetics dominated as the brain analogue, look-
ing at brain activities as control systems for managing the flow of
information which became action. Most recently, of course, the
brain is very often described in terms we associate with computers,
the information processing analogy seeming to provide the clearest
picture. Another recent explanation comes from the extensive re-
search of Karl Pribram and associates. Pribram’s concept of the
brain, encompassing the concepts of quantum physics and proba-
bility waves, would have us view memory as a holograph. Finally,
as discussed in Chapter II, the brain has been described by some
as a "dissipative structure" borrowing from Prigogine's thermody-
namic paradigm
.
Gradually
,
the analogies become more appropriate as research
data increases and methods are refined, and, perhaps, most impor-
tant, as scientists share information across disciplines and across
branches within disciplines (Rose p. 47; Miller, 1981).
The Mind/Brain Question
In addition to this analogical nature of brain study, histori-
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cally there have been two ways of describing activity of the brain:
as physical activity and as mental activity. As the previous chap-
ter pointed out, this division came about over a long period not
only because of ideological debate but also because of limitations on
our ability to actually observe or directly experience brain activity.
The following discussion of how the brain works will be shad-
owed by this division. On one level we wUl talk about physiological
and anatomical functions and on another level, yet referring to the
same brain activity, we will talk about mental (and emotional) activity.
Neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers continue this debate
over what is usually referred to as the "mind/brain" problem. At
an international science symposium in 1977, British neuroscientist,
John Eccles
,
presented a paper entitled "A Critical Appraisal of
Brain-Mind Theories." In the paper he outlined major positions on
whether mind and brain are the same, totally separate or somewhere
in between
.
He describes five theories: radical materialism; panpsychism;
epiphenomenalism
; psychophysical identity and, his own, the dualist-
interactionist theory.^
The "psychophysical identity theory" comes closest to the posi-
tion taken here on the relationship between mind and brain. There
are, as Eccles says, many variants of this theory and he cites six.
We will make use of the descriptions of two neuroscientists in addi-
tion to Eccles to get a brief but fuller picture of this way of looking
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at consciousness
. In Eccles- words part of the psychophysical Men
tity theory stresses that:
Mental processes are real... They are conjectured to be a
nlZtv
S
,
V6ry Sma11 and Select SrouP °f material objectsamely neural events in the brain... The conscious experiences
^identicaT T*
1”"
'<
-knowledge by acquaintance
, whereas theidentical physical events are known from without by descrip-tion.
^n£^lSdge_by_description
,
of the neural events in thebram. These events described by the neuroscientist turnout to be the experiences consciously perceived. Thus thekey postulate is essentially a parallelism or an inner andouter aspect (Eccles, 1977, p. 349 ).
A second view of the psycho-physical identity theory is sup-
ported by Steven Rose (1976). To deal with the division between
mental and physical mind/brain activity, he suggests a hierarchy
of several levels or "universes of discourse" with a point on each
level corresponding to a point on each level above and below it
(See Figure 2). Thus each activity has a corresponding reality at
each of the other levels. Rose suggests that the "confusion over
the relationship of mind to brain" has arisen because of attempts
to discuss an activity at more than one level of discourse at a time.
By this he means it is appropriate to assume a correlational relation-
ship between hierarchical levels but not to assume a causal relation-
ship. He gives the example that 'being in love' is a state that may
be accompanied by a certain change in molecular structure but that
being in love neither causes that change, nor is caused by it (pp
.
29-30) He further explains:
. . .in saying that the mind is the same as the brain at a
different level of discourse, I mean that for any event it
would be possible to provide two equally valid sets of
descriptions, one in 'mind' language, the other in 'brain'
language (p . 31).
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Systems
explanations
(holistic)
Unit
explanations
(reductionist)
Figure 2: Hierarchies in Biological Explanation
(Adapted from Steven Rose)
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Robert Miller proposes for us a third and somewhat different
view of the brain/mind relationship which is called
"psychophysical
parallelism" and which seems to me to be similar to that of Rose,
yet with some helpful elaborations. He maintains, as does Rose,
that, given the accepted definition of a causal relationship, it would
not make sense to posit such a relationship between what we see
when observing brain activity and what we experience directly with
the brain. He proposes that we use the concept of a ''logical trans -
formation without causal implications'' to understand the relationship
of subjective to objective reality with which our brains operate.
(He gives an example of this type of transformation: "...the process
by which geographical landmarks have their correspondence with
features on a map of the same area" p . 17 )
.
Miller concludes there to be a parallel nature between the sub-
jective realm mind and the objective realm brain but describes
this parallel nature as "...the sort of mapping of a 'field' of infor-
mation that might be possible in a multidimensional space" (1981,
p. 17). Miller goes further than most who identify themselves as
psychophysical parallelists in that he proposes constructs which
help to understand the unity which seems to characterize our con-
sciousness giving us consistent personalities and relative constancy
of purpose. He proposes a unity which can help to match the "ob-
jective properties of the brain and the subjective experience of con-
sciousness" (p. 20).
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The discussion on the mind/brain division is reminiscent of
the oppositional ideas in Chapter II. It has been carried on for
centuries and this study does not purport to solve the dilemma. I
take the position that consciousness is a process which both affects
and is generated by the interaction between matter and energy.
It is no longer important to contrast the material against the spiritual
or to pit conscious experience against physiological data for the
purpose of determining which is more valid. What is important is
to examine the relationships between and among identifiable levels
consciousness
,
as transformation and our experience of those
levels, finding a "common denominator" (Kornhuber, 1977, p. 322).
among them which can clarify and make accessible to us our capac-
ity for choice and reflection. (Please see Figure 3).
The Case for Intuition
Recent research regarding the possibly separate functions of
the left and right hemispheres of the brain has given prominence
to the discussion of intuitive capacity and its relationship to vari-
ous kinds of human activity. Research also indicates that the two
hemispheres of the brain seem to house fairly distinct functions.
(Please see Figure 4b). However, there is a great deal of fuzzi-
ness about how much separate control each hemisphere has over its
various domains. This is due to the existence of the corpus callosum,
a neural 'channel' between the two hemispheres which seems in most
cases to provide both sides of the brain with the same information
no matter which side of the body is stimulated.
Experience
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I QUANTUM
A Cosmic Objects
II ENERGY/MATTER
Sensory Tnpi.t&^iolo^iVal £xperrpiarA>
^ Information
HI SOCIAL ACTION/MEANING
Information — rj-evvee.
^ Communication/Action
M/
Transformation
>
Figure 3: Levels of Experience and Transformation
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b.
Figure 4: The Brain
(Adapted from Steven Rose)
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Therefore it seems that it might also be rather difficult to ex-
actly separate which part of the brain is thinking rationally and
which part is thinking intuitively, particularly when most activities
require some of both. Consequently, although it may be true that
intuitive and analytical functions can originate in separate hemi-
spheres, I believe the distinction can be misleading. Individuals
begin to identify themselves as being right or left brain dominant
with a kind of pathological attitude about ever being able to per-
form functions controlled on their recessive side.
I prefer an explanation of intuition which suggests that it is
not located in a separate part of the brain or even necessarily a
separate function, but that intuitive processes constitute the to-
tahty of conscious activity. That is, what we refer to as intuition
is in fact the overall organizing element which accounts for the
"unity of consciousness" (Miller, 1981, p. 192) and the "combined
workings of all... brain units" (Luria, 1973, p. 99).
I believe it is safe to say that nearly every brain process for
which we cannot readily account is ascribed to intuition. Creativ-
ity? psychic prediction, accurate guessing are among the many un-
explained phenomena of consciousness which have been ascribed to
intuition. Our ability to define intuitive processes was enhanced,
perhaps indirectly by split-brain research, when attempts were be-
gun to differentiate between capacities of the major brain hemi-
spheres
. Right brain or intuitive functions were said to include
pattern recognition, spatial or nonverbal thought, kinesthetic sense
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and musical ability (Bogen, 1973, pp . 103-4). While the left hemi-
sphere "measures, compartmentalizes, organizes and pigeonholes,"
the right "thinks in images
, sees in wholes..." and helps us to
"learn, create, and innovate" (Ferguson, 1980, pp. 789 ).
In this chapter we will attempt to refine the definition of intui-
tion and demonstrate a physiological basis for the role to be de-
scribed. In Chapter IV the related functions of reflection and choice
win be described in similar fashion.
MMgj2in&-lhe Paradigm; Wholistic and Interactive
In Chapter I we suggested that human consciousness has devel-
oped both a critical and an illusory function and that while the latter
was useful for us in interacting with our environment to survive,
it has, perhaps, developed to the detriment of the former. How
this happened may remain the secret of evolution but we can specu-
late that our interaction with nature affected our perception of real-
ity causing us to see the rocks and trees and earth in these forms,
helpful to us for our survival. It seems contradictory that this
function of consciousness which helps to create illusion should now
be our analytical, organizing agent (left brain) and that the critical
function so close to extinction should be the wholistic, (right brain)
unifying agent.
Henri Bergson describes it this way, according to Malcolm Westcott:
The prime reality is movement, change, evolution, interaction-
a dynamic flux which proceeds along a definite but unpredictable
course. The prime reality is. . .'the perpetual happening' or. . .
'duration.' The mind... is shielded from the perpetual happening
by the intellect, which imposes 'patterned immobility' on prime
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ob]ects and processes are unified (Westcott,
And,
hrough intuition (we) may attain that which was lost: in-
uition is the attainment of direct contact with prime realityirect experience of the perpetual happening, and nonintel-’lectual contact with pure duration (p.8).
Finally
,
...intuition is an experiential event ... unrestrained by reason...(and) can be sought and encouraged by divesting oneself of
restrictions imposed by the intellect... (p.10).
Although Bergson's description suggests employing intuition for
direct contact with "pure duration" the scope here will not encom-
pass mystical or transcendental experience. Our aim is to demon-
strate the link between intuitive processes and our capacity for
self-conscious or subjective awareness of our own thought and be-
havior. Hence, although there may seem an affinity between "ana-
lytical left hemisphere processes and "critical" consciousness, we
need to understand critical as being aware of the whole, as an ex-
panding awareness rather than a narrowing one. The left brain
sees the details and organizes them into patterns we are used to.
The right sees the whole in new, sometimes startling ways (in dreams,
images
,
artwork) .
Once again, although it is comfortable to use these right-left
distinctions for describing the different functions, the fact remains
they are functions of consciousness as a whole (functions of the
brain as a whole). Therefore, although Bergson describes intuition
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"unrestrained by reason” our intuitive capacity encompasses
reason, logic, and other analytical types of thinking but sidesteps
them in its process. The two sides of the chart of "ways of know-
ing” in Chapter II should also be viewed as interactive parts of
the whole of consciousness
.
Intuitive processes have long been associated with the creative
arts (Gardner, 1982; Ghiselin, 1952) and, perhaps less popularly,
with natural science. In spite of the downplay of subjective exper-
ience in scientific investigation, in 1959, Jerome Bruner, psychologist
and educator, was invited to a gathering of scientists to discuss
how to improve the teaching of science in schools. The scientists
stressed the importance of intuitive thinking, as well they might.
Early in the 20th century
,
earthshaking discoveries in mathematics
and science had their roots in intuitive thinking. Jules Henri
Poincare, a mathematician who revelled in "...the harmony of
numbers and forms ... (the) true esthetic feeling that all real mathe-
maticians know..." described the creative process of mathematics
this way
:
Now, what are the mathematic entities to which we attribute
this character of beauty and elegance, and which are
capable of developing in us a sort of esthetic emotion?
They are those whose elements are harmoniously disposed
so that the mind without effort can embrace their totality
while realizing the details (Poincare
,
1952
,
p. 40).
(my emphasis)
When asked to describe what mental images of words were
part of his discovery process, Albert Einstein wrote:
...words or ... language, as they are written or spoken, do
not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The
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as with the Theory of Relativity, once the image was clear,
the experiments imagined in the head, as with Poincare', the details
were realizable and able to be set down in mathematical formulation
to "prove" the theory. With evidence of this nature, intuition
gained a respectable position in scientific endeavor. Physicist
Fritjof Capra supports the point: "The rational part of research
would, in fact, be useless if it were not complemented by the intu-
ition that gives scientists new insights and makes them creative"
(Capra, 1975, p. 18).
As philosophers continued to refine their concepts of intuition
we discover a relationship to belief: "...in all acts of reason there
is an element of intuition ... there is the belief in certain self-evident
truths..." (Westcott, 1968, p.19) reminiscent of Miller's description
of inductive thinking in Chapter II. Acknowledging that reason is
therefore based on something that is subjectively known or believed
opened the way for intuition to be viewed as a kind of inference.
This implied that knowledge based on intuition could be tested, made
clearer by reasoning and hence verified or dispelled, according to
Ewing (Westcott, p.19). This recognition of intuitive processes
in the scientific method has required a special adjustment in terms
in order for intuition to fit within the positivist mold. Intuition
72
became known in the natural sciences and psychology
inference .
"
as "inductive
Intuition as Inference
Westcott reports that in general in psychological explanations
for intuition there have been three interpretations: Jungian, intu-
ition as inference, and the Verstehenist or "global understanding"
verson. (1968, p. 185) On the one hand, while Jung saw intuition
as a "simple given function of humans" he also suggested that the
"unconscious process of .. .mankind" could be a source for intuitive
knowledge which could have universal implications for our lives
(Westcott, pp. 1868).
Among- the explanations offered by psychologists who linked
intuition to inference certain characteristics appear with regularity.
Intuitive thinking deals with a complexity of inputs that often seem
beyond organized explanation, for example in formulating theory as
in the Einstein example. Intuitive thinking is also characterized
by extremely rapid coding or categorizing of this complex material
(Westcott, p.42). Third, a feeling and conviction of certainty
based upon the "knowledge of acquaintance" or subjective, internal
information of the act itself accompanies the intuitive process
.
Poincare has described this as the feeling which accompanies the
"apprehension of a discovery" (Westcott, p. 50).
In addition to complexity, rapidity and certainty, intuition
arrives at its conclusions without knowing how. This "unknown"
quality has been described as the "unconscious use of unconscious
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cues" (Westcott, p. 46). This leads to the debate about whether
intuitive processes are avaUable to awareness or not. In linking
intuition to inference, Westcott believes that the main difference is
that in inferential thinking the process by which one reached a con-
clusion can be remembered and told to someone else, hence analyzed
for inconsistency. Intuitive thinking, however, is generally not
avaUable in this way. It is this "obscurity or inexplicitness com-
bined with accuracy" which makes intuition a "special case of infer-
ence." This definition offers a view to the total perspective of the
inferential position:
Intuition as a form of inference behavior is based on inexplicit
sensory data, rapidly and inexplicitly combined, leading to
plausible or correct conclusions with the subject being unable
to specify how the conclusion was reached (Westcott, p. 78).
Finally
,
intuitive thinking is also characterized as having a predic-
tive quality which, in a sense, "qualified" it for becoming a case
of inferential thinking.
Each of these characteristics of complexity, rapidity, certainty,
unconsciousness, and prediction have significance for our discussion
of intuition, although some will receive more attention than others.
In looking at intuition as a critical function with a wholistic perspec-
tive able to tap the totality of the complex of highly organized
systems which some see consciousness to be, we are concerned with
the physiological activity which accompanies this process and the
ability to be aware of some aspects of this intuitive process.
Gordon Allport, in his work on analyzing personality, arrived at
this description of intuition as inference:
74
perc«uL
aPI
?rf
r
h
S tHat understa"<3ing , that is patternederception, is t e event of placing one's various inferencesnto a network, of interlocking hierarchies which yields a
(Westcon”p
°
32
P
)
redICtlVe SUCCess and esthetic satisfaction
In line with this view of intuition as being able to link percep-
tions with the "network of interlocking hierarchies" that are the
contents of consciousness we will next consider the importance of
perception in making use of our intuitive capacity.
Perception - A Kind of Choosing
In his theory of personality, Jung referred to sensation and
intuition as two of the four "mental functions constitutionally present
m all individuals" (Westcott, p. 32). While sensation was described
as perceiving sensory detail through reception of sense data from
the internal and external world, intuition he defined as the "percep-
tion of possibilities, implications, principles, and objects as totalities
(at the expense of details) (Westcott, p. 33). Now we will look at
the form of perception attributed to sensation, looking at the very
particular and microcosmic level of the neuronal activity which accom-
panies our ability to perceive
.
The Neuron - A Unit of Transformation
The basic physical component in the brain's transformation
system is the nerve cell or neuron
. As Figure 6 illustrates
,
its
major components are the dendrites, the cell body, the axon, nodes,
and the synapse which connects with the next neuron, or in the
case of this diagram, with a muscle. In addition to these nerve
parts, numerous chemical elements and compounds are involved in
75
Figure 6: The Neuron
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the ^formation flow, including the elements sodium and potassium,
well as various
'transmitter substances' which function at the
synapse
.
Like most other cells in the body, the brain cell has what is
called a resting membrane potential due to the uneven distribution
along its various parts (dendrite, body, axon, synapse) of sodium
and potassium ions. The unique aspect of most brain cells is that
they are excitable. That is, they have the capacity to conduct
what is called an action potential, a pulse of electricity which passes
from the dendrite or cell body all the way through the axon to the
mynad of synaptic connections impinging on the entire cell.
In order to trace a "message" through the brain’s systems we
can take a very simplified example. In this case, let's say the orig-
inal external stimulus comes through the eyes in the form of a figure
walking toward you. Light striking the person is reflected and
enters your eyes, slowing down and bending as it passes through
the lens in your eye. The bent light continues on its journey till
it strikes the retina where these quanta of energy or "photons"
then pile up in the same order (albeit upsidedown
! ) as you first
viewed the figure. This light energy is received at the retina (a
thin sheet of nerve cells) by receptor nerve cells called rods and
cones. And here the visual information begins to be translated
into the electrical language of the nervous system. (This early
processing of visual information by the retina has caused the retina
to be described as an "outgrowth of the brain" itself) (Gregory,
1966, p. 44).
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At the psychological level we can now imagine how our powers
of perception are involved in this process of transforming light en-
ergy into meaning and action in our hrains. Some view perception
as the beginning of a process of reducing uncertainty. The stimulae
or information received through the senses present us with a degree
of uncertainty or complexity (Smith 1975, Bruner 1971) about what
is going on around and within us. Our sensory mechanisms are
actually very highly adapted to perform this function. The senses
are tuned to take in information which is necessary for our survival
at the moment and this is usually done without our being quite con-
scious of it. Driving is a good example. And though it appears
that we as humans are continuing to adapt to greater and greater
complexity in our surroundings, there is a significant proportion
of "information" or stimulae in our worldly surround which we do
not sense or pay attention to consciously. Probably the example
most often given is the limitation of our visual sense in perceiving
the wide range of electromagnetic waves which represent energy
transfer in the universe. We see only the tiny band indicated on
the spectrum in Figure 7. Such a "limitation" need not be viewed
as negative, nor even as rigid, since there are many examples of
training the eye to see what was previously not visible (e.g.,
combinations of colors an artist perceives which I do not, night
vision, auras). However, this type of limitation points out how
perception can be considered a part of our illusory function. We
see what has been most helpful for us to see as part of evolution
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Figure: 7 Electromagnetic Spectrum
Adapted from Lincoln Barnett
The electromagnetic spectrum reveals the narrow range of radiation
visible to man's eye. From the standpoint of physics, the only dif-
ference between radio waves, visible light, and such high-frequen-
cy forms of radiation as X-rays and gamma rays lies in their wave
length. But out of this vast range of electromagnetic radiation,
extending from cosmic rays with wave lengths of only one trillionth
of a centimeter up to infinitely long radio waves, the human eye
selects only the narrow band indicated in white on the above chart.
Man s perceptions of the universe in which he dwells are thus re-
stricted by the limitations of his visual sense. Wave lengths are
indicated on the chart by the denary system: i.e., 103 centimeters
equals 10 x 10 x 10 equals 1,000; and 10- 3 equals 1/10 x 1/10 x
1/10 equals 1/1,000. (Barnett, 1948, p. 21)
79
and our interaction with our environment. „e are used to believ-
ing that we see all there is to see. However, when someone proves
that we just missed seeing that person standing two feet away, we
accept that we "weren't paying attention," or our minds were "some-
where else." This selective function of perception has been explained
by Luria:
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object perceived. The more complex the object per-ceived, and the less familiar it is, the more detailed thisperceptual activity will be (1973, p. 240).
This hypothesis-testing idea is supported by R. L. Gregory.
He gives the example of looking at an "ambiguous figure" such as
the one seen in Figure 8 and trying to understand exactly how it
goes since it keeps defying what we expect. "Perception," he says
"changes spontaneously, from moment to moment, as various orienta-
tions... are selected as hypotheses of reality...", i.e., of what
the figure really is (1978, p. 221).
Our role in choosing what we see through this hypothesis test-
ing process represents one of the major adjustments in psychological
theory away from the behavioral approach and toward the cognitive.
Perception, which used to be viewed as a "...passive imprint made
by external stimuli on the retina... and the visual cortex" (Luria,
1973, p. 229) is instead a complex combination of "imagining, think-
ing, and remembering" (Neisser, 1982, p. 45) in which we antici-
pate what we are going to see and draw on our past experience to
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Figure 8: Ambiguous Figure
(Adapted from Robert Gregory)
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interpret. This new understanding has major significance for the
development of the critical function of consciousness. The role of
choice in perceiving, imagining, and attending is accepted as a
given in the cognitive approach.
that nJool. h
c°Smtlve psychology agree, at least implicitly,pe p e choose much of what they know. The choices aremade m many ways: through selective attention ... the acquisi-tion of cognitive skills... we are largely responsible for whatwe come to know (Neisser, 1982, p. 45).
If it is true that we are responsible for what we know, that
in adapting to our environment for survival we construct our own
reality (Davidson, 1980, p.13), is it possible to become conscious
of how we do this and to intervene to chage our perceptions when
they are no longer helpful? Evidence supports a positive answer
to this question. The following description of how neurons assist
in "discriminating" in order to make sense and the accompanying
interpretation of the synapse as a construct which makes choice
possible will help to explain our potential for self-consciously direct-
ing action
. For although much of the information processing that
accompanies our attempt to make meaning
proceeds in the absence of conscious awareness ... and although
many cognitive psychologists have assumed these structures to
be relatively static and fixed in the constraints they impose on
our cognitive competence, recent evidence indicates that with
appropriate, intensive practice, the constraints that these
structures impose can be significantly modified (Davidson,
1980, p. 18).
In particular, where perception is concerned, this paper proposes
that attending can be enhanced through skill practice to increase
our awareness of and ability to influence perception and learning
/
in general.
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As we continue with our message along its physiological path,
we discover how choice occurs at this level as well. In its electrical
form, the original stimulas created by light reflecting off the person
walking toward us and entering our eyes is now broken up a bit
as each of numerous sets of neurons analyzes it for certain informa-
tion. These sets of nerve ceUs each have a particular coding or
translating function to further refine the message. As the message,
or what is now a series of signals, travels from one set of neurons
to another, it does so by jumping a gap between nerve ceUs. This
gap is called the synapse.
The Synapse - A Space for Transformation and Choice
As we shah see in subsequent pages, the synapse holds a spe-
cial place in the structure of consciousness. It is to the synapse
. . . that we must look to begin to introduce that element of
variety which must be the key to the nervous system, which
must distinguish it from an inevitable system in which, for
a given input, there is an invariant output of response.
For it is at the synapses that it will be decided whether
or not the next cell will fire in its turn (Rose 1976,
pp. 78-79).
It is estimated that synaptic space comprises about 10 percent of
the total volume of the brain (Rose, p.68) and at these numerous
junctures along each nerve cell another transforming process occurs
.
The electrical message becomes a chemical one.
When the action potential travelling along the axon reaches
the presynaptic area it is translated into a signal which releases a
chemical transmitter substance from tiny synaptic vesicles . Whereas
the nature of the axon throughout its total length is to continue
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firing-, the synapse exercises control. It can "say No as well as
Yes" sending either an excitatory or inhibitory impulse, as described
above. The choice of whether to fire or not is apparently made at
the post-synaptic point, that is, the point on the next cell where
the chemical message is received. Our poor tired message is then
carried across the synaptic cleft (please see Figure 9) and is re-
ceived by receptor molecules which translate the message back into
an electrical pulse for its journey through the dendrite, cell body
and axon of the next neuron. The next neuron analyzes the sum
of impulses it may be receiving along its various parts, weighs the
most important and fires accordingly. In emphasizing the importance
of the "choice point," Rose says, "Consciousness, learning, and
intelligence are all synapse-dependent. It is not too strong to say
that the evolution of humanity followed the evolution of the synapse"
(Rose, 1976, p. 79).
J. Z. Young also views what happens at the cellular level as
choosing. He gives the example of bacteria in a new environment
selecting an enzyme from among those their DNA allows them to pro-
duce in order to make food from the new environment.
What is important for us is to see that the whole cell is
involved in a process of detection, communication, and
then selection from a set of possible actions. This
process is similar in principle to the vastly more complex
acts of choice that we ourselves make . . . All choice
depends upon selecting among a set of possible actions
(Young, 1978, p. 19).
The opportunities for "choice" at synaptic points is, perhaps,
infinite. All axons have numerous branchings which connect with
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Figure 9: Synapse and Synaptic Cleft
(Adapted from Steven Rose)
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other neurons. Impulses received in the axon travel to all of these
branches. At the same time the dendrites of each cell make connec-
tions with myraids of other neurons and receive or potentially re-
ceive impulses from them. These synaptic connections have been
measured in the hundreds or thousands, the largest number re-
corded on one nerve cell being around 80,000 (Eccles, 1973, p.
103)
But how does a message get through this mass of electrical/
chemical activity? It is often useful to think of part of the trans-
formation process of the brain as one of coding, classifying and
storing information. Thinking of electrical and chemical activity as
information can help unify this multi-level picture of consciousness
we are painting. Kornhuber suggests that although psychic and
physiological processes may not be the same, they do have the same
"information content" (1977, p. 322). Perhaps he states this with
such certainty because of the advances which have occurred in ana-
lyzing the coding and classifying mechanisms of the brain (Rose,
1976, pp. 131-4).
Information Processing
As we have seen, there is an immense amount of activity going
on in the brain. If we consider that there are some 10 11 (Teyler,
1978, p. 48) brain cells in the average brain with all of them active
all the time, the problem is compounded. The challenge for con-
sciousness is to derive meaning from this constant and multidimen-
sional "noise . "
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As Eccles says
:
there is almost always background firing of neurons
cortex
W
are
n
fir"
n6Ur°nS °f y°Ur ^rebraling impulses. Actually some fire even fasterwhen you are asleep than when you are awake. Thero em is to extract a reliable performance out of thenervous system, considering that it has so much back-ground noise (Eccles, 1973, p. 103)
Extracting reliable performance is made possible by a certain colum-
nar arrangement of cells, the same species or kinds of neurons are
organized together in groups receiving and transmitting the type
of message specific to its genetic and chemical make-up. Having
one neuron fire an impulse would not work—the message would be
"lost.” These groups or clusters of similar neurons serve to ampli-
fy a signal, "shout(ing) together" to get the signal to the next
cluster, and so on until the impulses of these and other clusters
spread "meaningful signals widely and selectively in the cerebral
cortex" that scientists believe are what result in conscious experi-
ence (Eccles, 1973, p. 98).
Eccles emphasizes that this columnar arrangement also provides
what he caHs a "discriminatory judgment" in helping to transmit a
strong and meaningful signal. This is accomphshed through an
intricate mechanism caHed inhibition, briefly referred to above.
Nerve cells that accomplish inhibition are speciaUy designed and
make use of unique transmitter substances, different from those of
excitatory neurons. In contrast to the neuron described above,
they do not generate impulses and are usually without axons
(Pribram, 1980, p. 48). The inhibitory cells work through a kind
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of feedback system which helps to keep down the level of excitation
of neurons not involved in the particular body motion or brain activ-
ity trying to be accomplished. They somehow "know" to suppress
discharges from more weakly charging cells. The most intense ex-
citatory unpulses are thus accompanied by these helper inhibitory
impulses which suppress others in the nearby area, or "surround."
Thus we are able to stand with knees bent because inhibitory neu-
rons keep flexor muscles from contracting. Or, in the case of the
person walking toward us, we see (or do not see) the person de-
pending on the competing messages (people, traffic) entering our
sensory system.
By this time our message will have arrived at the cells of the
brain called the visual cortex where higher order analysis is per-
formed and final interpretations and storage occur. Here we ap-
proach the structures of consciousness which underlie the unifying
process of intuition. Miller stresses that meaning is a network of
bits of information, a "...complex structure ... in which prolific
interrelationships are the essence" (1981, p. 50).^ He further
specifies that there is a spatial and temporal nature to the acqui-
sition of meaning which is what eventually constitutes both short
and long term memory. Meaning in his interpretation is "a clus-
tering of statistically significant associations in space and time"
(p. 65). Whether or not the message we receive is stored as knowl-
edge (and hence can be viewed as learning) depends on a complex
system of association with other messages which will be described
below when we discuss the storage of information.
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This vast network of neuronal circuitry has been described as
"omniconnected" (Miner, p. 181)
, "multipotential" (John> ^
Chap. 6) and holographic (Pribram, 1980, Chap. 3). Such could
be the source of much of what we do not understand about intui-
tional thinking, o, aU thinking for that matter. Such a structure
implies that within the brain there is a »» run
...diffusely connected
neural network" where every neuron has the potential to influence
every other. This does not imply that every neuron is physicaUy
connected to every other but that each has access to the others
through electrical and chemical transmission. Hence, the possi-
bility for categorizing and associating which creates our store of
knowledge
.
Information Storage
The Symbolic Transformation
Deriving meaning at the cognitive level can be seen to involve,
then, the coding and classifying or categorizing of information for
storage in a vast network of neuronal connections. We can recall
the example of the person moving toward us. Now, whether you
immediately store the message and 'forget' about it, or whether you
think on who this might be, or whether you otherwise act on this
information, it remains that somehow, the configuration of light en-
ergy which entered your eyes has now come to represent the con-
cept in your consciousness of another being like yourself. How
does the "shouting" that your nerve cells are doing become an image,
perhaps a word in your consciousness, symbolically representing
the person approaching you?
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When we consider this picture of what happens in the brain,
i ' e " ^ "mental" P^ure, the role of language in meaning becomes
most evident. This ability of the brain to transform energy into
the symbolic or sign systems of language and mathematics is linked
directly to human experience both through action on external objects
and through our perception of those objects. Without attempting a
detailed discussion of this aspect of transformation, this section
looks at our capacity for imagery and its link to intuitive
processes
,
For Caleb Gattegno, founder and proponent of the "silent way"
method of language teaching, understanding language involves under-
standing perception as the "true contact(s) between our selves and
the environment" (1976, p. 33). The certainty or meaning associated
with words, he says, comes from
the actual energy changes experienced by our system when it
is submitted to either mechanical impacts (including those... [on
our] eardrums), or electromagnetic impacts (including the photons
that reach our retina)
,
or heat and chemical impacts on our nerve
endings (p. 33).
The impact of these "inputs of energy from the cosmos" as Gatte
gno calls them (p . 33) stimulate receptors (in the eyes, for ex-
ample) which are coded to understand and transmit shape, color,
density, and movement (Gregory, 1966). Each different species of
nerve cell carries one specific bit of information regarding a par-
ticular feature of what we see (Young, 1978, p. 50), say the color
of the coat of someone walking toward us. Similarly, the sounds
which come to us both from the outside and from our own vocal
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cords are experienced and coded for our use These perceptions
of sight and sound become
(Gattegno, p. 35).
associated in the formation of images
tual
However, unages do not seem to be the result only of percep
experience, but also of 'practical activity" (Vygotsky, 1978)
The most significant moment in the course of intellectualdevelopment.
. .occurs when speech and practical activity two
T s?ependent Iines of“P-nt,y 'c0r
In analyzing the origins of speech Vygotsky's research indicated
that sometimes if kept from speaking, a child was not able to accom-
plish a task. He says that speech and action or problem solving
are part of the same psychological function. And, that this
"•••unity of perception, speech, and action ... ultimately produces
internalization of the visual field..." (p. 26). This is the Piagetian
stage of "preoperational thought" when language and ideas begin
to merge (Wadsworth, 1971).
The ability to construct images inside our heads of the world
outside allows us to plan, to dream, to reconstruct happenings from
the past, to be aware of expectations. The ability to solve problems
by visualizing more than verbalizing has been identified as an intui-
tive cognitive style (Bastick, 1982, p. 192) which makes use of a
kind of "shorthand intermingled with organized thinking" (C. Farmer,
1961, quoted in Bastick, p. 191). Imagery can be viewed, then,
as a quicker way of retrieving information from an interconnected
store of knowledge.
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The Distributed Store
What is most significant for us, eventually, is to get a clearer
idea of just how this retrieval o, information from memory is accom-
plished. Therefore it is important to look a bit more closely at how
might be stored. At one time, it was believed that memory was
localized in specific parts of the brain. That is, information re-
ceived and stored by a particular- ^y icular set of neurons would remain in
the location of those neurons. Such a concentration of information
was called an "engram." Evidence indicates, however, that infor-
mation is probably stored diffusely or perhaps in sets, corresponding
to interacting brain systems (Thompson, Berger, and Berry, 1980,
P- 222). Thus it seems that memories of specific ideas or events
often be found to be stored "...over a wide extent of tissue"
(Pribram, 1978, p. 149). Pribram refers to this aspect of memory
as the "distributed store." From another perspective, but with
similar conclusions, E. Roy John presents what he calls a "statistical
configuration theory" which proposes that
...information is diffusely available to most, if not all,brain regions
... (and) is represented not by activity in
a specific neuron or a selected pathway, but by the
average temporal pattern of firing in anatomically
extensive populations or neurons. The activity of
any neuron... is significant only insofar as it con-
tributes to the average behavior of the ensemble,
to the statistical process (John, 1980, p. 131).
John refers to this characteristic as the "multipotentiality" of the
brain. He says that while the same message may be stored at var-
ious sites in the brain, retrieval will most likely be accomplished
from that site where the "signal- to-noise" ratio is highest; that
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is, where, as we described earlier, the impulses of a particular
message have succeeded the best at inhibiting all others in the
surround
.
It is generally accepted that the greater the frequency of an
impulse the stronger it is, hence the better chance of making it
through the noise of surrounding, constantly firing nerve cells
(Miller, 1981, Eccles
, 1873). Thus, in order to hear, see, smell,
taste and make sense out of our experience we depend on the brain
to
. . .perform complex calculations on the frequencies of the data
it receives" (Ferguson, 1980, p. 179). If we think back to the
person walking toward us, our understanding of that person's iden-
tity will be based on an incredibly intricate system of impulses,
calculations and selections by the nervous system in our heads.
Space and Time in the Distributed Store
The fact that decades of brain research have not produced
the location of an engram (a static gathering of neurons represent-
ing a specific memory) at any one time in any one place has striking
similarity to the difficulty Heisenberg illustrated of measuring both
the location and speed of a subatomic particle at the same time
.
That is
,
although memory associated with a certain skill would have
been expected to be housed in the area of the brain where that
function primarily resides (i.e., speech in the left hemisphere)
patients whose brains had been damaged in that area were able to
perform the skill without difficulty after some practice. This capac-
ity is referred to as redundancy of function (Rose, 1976; Routtenberg,
1980).
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The fact of redundancy makes it impossible to think of a knowl-
edge store where happenings of the past are recorded as they happen
and remain that way undisturbed and in one location until we call
them forth. This is, however, how most people view memory - as a
static record of things past. I suggest that it is the illusory, par-
ticulate, organizing function of consciousness which creates for us
this linear concept of time where things happen to us one after the
other and are recorded in that same order in the knowledge store.
This is a level of reality at which we normally operate. However,
another level of reality must be considered if we are to understand
the critical wholistic function of consciousness.
We recall our earlier discussion of the Kantian view of con-
sciousness from which Miller draws support for his conclusion that
intuition (inductive inference) allows us to recognize spatial and
temporal patterns (Chapter II). These patterns in space and time
are not linear, however, but probabilistic. That is, our intuitive
capacity is capable of "viewing" all that happens to us, our re-
corded experience, as a whole, rather than in particular pieces.
This wholistic recognition, however, is not usually directly avail-
able to consciousness, hence the linear concept of time (past,
present, future) dominates our daily reality. This picture of
reality is most helpful for our daily activities. However, if a por-
tion of our brain were to be damaged, we would be glad to rely on
this wholistic capacity for "recalling" information supposedly stored
in the damaged area.
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explain this capacity, Karl Pribram (1978, 1980) has pro-
pose the analogy o, the hologram,* a three-dimensional promotion
of "points of information" which represents
"occurrences" byJh~es rather than something which happened at a particular
time and is therefore stored in spatial relation to other happenings.
These occurrences have no space/time dimension as we are used
to thinking of them,* yet through the integrative capacity of both
illusory and critical functions we are able to recall bits of informa-
tion to reconstruct occurrences as they might have happened.
The further significance of the holographic explanation for
information storage lies in its image-making capacity. Pribram states
that research has been done which indicates that not only visual
but auditory, kinesthetic, and gustatory images are also created in
holographic form within the brain (1980, p.60). Thus the results
of our experience through the senses, i.e., our perceptions, can
become images in our consciousness which lead to thought and lan-
guage. Further, holographic storage of information permits an
"astronomic" number of neural connections to form a network of
internal relationships which are a source for mental imagery and
thought (Miller, 1981). This picture of how the brain makes mean-
ing out of experience indeed presents a probabilistic picture of con-
sciousness as a "quantum process". But it is a process character-
ized by a probability which conveys potential rather than randomness
*In Heisenberg's words they are "something in the middle between
the idea of an event and the actual event" (Zukav, 1979, p. 66)
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Summary
This chapter has attempted to present both psychologies! and
Physiological explanations of how „e choose in perceiving and de-
riving meaning. This "choosing..
- that is, the acceptance of one
alternative at a time above many which are possible - has, as we
have seen, explanations in both "mind" and
..brain" language, to
use Rose's terms. Recognition of this ability as an innate capacity
is a necessary part of achieving self-consciousness about our ac-
tions and developing critical consciousness.
Secondly, the chapter has presented evidence for viewing
memory, or as we prefer to call it, the store of knowledge in
neural circuitry, as a multiconnected system. The storage of infor-
mation in this system is viewed as a process of preparation for syn-
thesis (retrieval) at a later time; an activity which can be viewed
as part of our intuitive capacity to have access to the complete
store, access at any one time to the whole of information in our
consciousness
.
This view of consciousness supports the possibility of devel-
oping our critical capacity for viewing the whole and for synthe-
sizing "old" information in a "new" way as opposed to emphasizing
our illusory capacity which makes use of the same combinations
(habitual thoughts) in the same old way.
The next chapter will elaborate on the method of synthesizing
or retrieving new information from the distributed store as a way
of making use of our unique intuitive capacity with emphasis on
the capacity for imagery.
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ab°r (1948) ^ an attempt to improve the electron microscope.Alt ough it is described as photographic, holography makes it possibleto create a photographic image, a picture, without the use of a lensand instead using an arrangement of laser beam, mirror, object andphotographic plate. The laser beam is significant in its difference from
regular light. Laser light is coherent, that is, the waves of light
which make up its beam all have the same wavelength (also referred to
as monochromatic). In creating a holographic image part of a laser beam
is directed toward an object while the other part of the beam is re-flected off a mirror onto a photographic plate. The part of the laserdirected toward the object is reflected, refracted and scattered off the
surfaces of the object and also arrives on the same plate. This plate
then contains a record of all of the "optical" or amplitude and wave-
length (phase) information of the object.
A three dimensional holographic image can be created by beaming
another laser through the film made from the plate above. It is three
dimensional because of the unique characteristic in holography that all
of the possible optical information about the object has been recorded
on the plate. Regular photographs usually record amplitude information
but not phase information. Hence the image can be visible in the air
some distance from the actual object and appear to be "real." (Infor-
mation obtained from World Book and Encyclopaedia Britannica .)
CHAPTER IV
TRAINING INTUITION
Introduction
In the previous chapter we considered both physiological and
psychological evidence for viewing intuition as a unifying function
of consciousness through which critical consciousness can be devel-
oped. In order to create an integrated picture of brain/mind work-
ings we followed a "message" through a very simplified version of
physiological and psychological processes. On that journey three
important factors emerged: the major role of perception as our way
of directly experiencing input from the world outside our bodies;
how choosing is an activity which occurs at many levels in our phys-
ical and mental selves; and how the proposed probabilistic nature
of imagery provides unique access to our store of knowledge.
This chapter will build on these capacities for choice and image-
ry as it describes the physiology and practice of training intuition
and the possibilities of self-conscious, subjective knowing.
The Nature of Experience - A Second Look
In Chapter II experience was described as a dialectic activity
wherein we both act on something to change it and are changed
ourselves. The change in ourselves will concern us most in this
section as we seek evidence for physiological change that can be
monitored at the psychological level. Such monitoring or awareness
underlies our capacity for self-conscious, subjective knowing.
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Plasticity
basic level we have defined learning (Chapter I)
as "changing through experience,- There is substantial evidence
that the change
-in ourselves- which occurs as a result of this
learning is detectable at many levelsy . Neuroscientists agree that
in activity is detectable and measurable:
events and can be measur^^t
^ haS 3 baSiS ^ neurona l
operations fire neurons... in comni
™ 8 ° Slg:nals which hy synaptic
(Eccles, 1973
, p 104 )
P ex organizational patterns
Learning is also detectable over time, as a process, at neurophysi-
ological. biological, and anatomical levels (Rose, 1976, p. 238 );
and, I would add, at the psychological and social levels.
To understand these levels o, change we return, notably, to
the locus of choice in our internal universe.- the synapse. Here
research indicates a dramatic example of the capacity for change as
a result of learning. In neurophysiological terms this change is
referred to as plasticity, as mentioned in Chapter II. Steven Rose
offers this description of plasticity at behavioral and neuronal levels:
.tdiv-H
b
ffvi,ral Plasticity means the capacity of thein idual to learn, to be modified, by experience. At theneuronal level we must expect to find the brain's modified
of ren.T
6 eXP,ressed “ of a modification of biochemistry,
cellular architecture and connectivity, of the electrical re-sponses of the brain (1976, p. 213).
Although the collections of nerve cells which are responsible for
specific features and which shout as a unit to make themselves
heard seem not to be able to change, what does apparently change
is the synaptic connections each of these nerve cells makes with
their neighbors (Eccles, 1973).
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Evidence from experiments with animals learning new activities indi-
cate that a synapse can generate new connections and that totally
new synapses can be generated from the nerve cell (please see
Figure 10) (Lynch and Wells, 1978).
This concept of the "modifiable" synapse is believed to be the
microlevel structure which makes possible the storage of information
gained from experience, hence the recording of change occurring
from experience, hence learning (Eccles, 1973; Miller, 1981). The
difference between short-term and long-term memory is proposed to
depend on the length of time of neural impulses transmitting infor-
mation. Synaptic growth (enabling long-term storage) is thought
to require anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours of electrical and
chemical activity. Evidence indicates that protein synthesis (the
production of RNA) must also accompany this change at the synapse
(Eccles, 1973, p. 185).
When considering the changes which occur at this physiological
level over possibly millions of neuronal sites when we are experienc-
ing
,
doing, thinking, it becomes easy to understand why learning
takes energy, a healthy environment and a nutritionally sound body.
It is important to recognize that although we are all born with the
marvelously intricate capacities described here, maintenance of sup-
portive learning conditions require attention to all the details of
the learning process. Attention to the totality of the educational
setting will be given later in this chapter.
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Figure 10: Synaptic Change
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g^^nsciousn^ and Subjective Knnw,^
We can now consider the possibilities of being aware of the
collective experience of plasticity at other levels of our body sys-
tems. We have defined self-consciousness as an internal awareness
p ysical and psychological processes. Gattegno colorfully de-
this capacity as he explains how he believes we generate
speech
:
can ? J
drowned in reality and knowing truth directly
is truth 1 86 th6re iS n° trUth word s but that therem the consistency of the appearance of some words andsome events affecting us. Because we learn as babies to talkto ourselves.
. .we know intimately that our vocal system can behnked to our hearing system and that we can transmute soundsmade by ourselves into sounds heard and manage to peel off
words from the voices we hear, including our own. The mental-physiological reality of words comes to us from the work we do
Crib
’
firSt With ourselves and later with the environment(1976, pp. 34-35).
The truth Gattegno speaks of is the truth of experience, the exper
lence of sensing and feeling the "mental-physiological" workings of
our body systems as we apprehend or appropriate the objects of
our environment, including ourselves. This ability, of which we
have not learned to be conscious, is possible because of the intui-
tive capacity of the brain to seek and establish relations among the
various levels of our experience.
If we are to become conscious of this capacity, as this paper
sugi?ests is possible, we need to identify ways to notice what is
going on at levels we aren’t used to attending to. To know intro-
spectively or subjectively what is happening at various levels as
we think and act we can make use of our five senses, in particular
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that of feeling, and we can make use of our
We will consider examples of both methods.
capacity for imagery
.
Being Conscious of Physical Change
As mentioned earlier it has been possible for some time to
measure through electroencephalogram (EEG) the changes in rhythm
of electrical impulses in the brain. Experiments where subjects
have attempted to control these rhythms through conscious processes
indicate both that it is possible (Nowlis and Kamiya, 1970; Wallace
and Benson, 1972) but also that changes in these rhythms are accom-
panied by physical changes which are discernable such as the rate
of respiration and slowing of the heartbeat (Wallace and Benson,
p. 266). 1
In studies of intuitional processes, researchers have attempted
to identify detectable physical signals which accompany these pro-
cesses. It was found in a problem solving activity with college stu-
dents that heart rate increased sharply at three identifiable stages
in the activity. However, when asked, problem solvers did not re-
port they had been aware of these changes (Westcott, 1968, p. 93).
Presumably, according to the premise of this paper, they could have
been aware of these changes
,
since changes in heart rate are know-
able to us directly
.
Emotion
To understand how we can know more about our psychological
selves by paying attention to such things as heart rate and respira-
tion some researchers on intuitive processes have sought links be-
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tween exnotion and the way information is categorized and stored in
our consciousness (Bastick, 1982
, p . 216) . Gne theory proposes
that information may be stored according to certain
-emotional sets"
indicating that we were in a particular emotional state when the
information was taken in and that it might be recalled quickly if
that emotional state were re-experienced (Bastick, p. 217 ).
Bastick proposes that by paying attention to the "...multitude
of physiological dimensions that constitute our feelings" we can be
better in touch with these emotional sets, of which feelings are a
part (p. 263). Research shows that the limbic 2 area of the brain
(please see Figure 4a) which houses the major endocrine glands
(hence is a center of hormone production) functions in maintaining
homeostasis or the 'constancy of the internal environment' for the
whole human system. This region (the hypothalamus in particular)
also plays a role in generating the combined physical-mental states
we refer to as emotion (Rose, 1976; Bastick, 1982).
A Physiological Base for Self-Consciousness
The complex interaction of these systems is characterized by
what are called feedback mechanisms which help to maintain homeo-
static conditions in the body/mind. Recently, Karl Pribram has
proposed that a similar type of mechanism, but called "feedforward",
can be considered to be responsible for our capacity to attend to
these internal events and to be self-conscious. He differentiates
between "perceptual" consciousness, our normal daily state which I
have called the illusory function, and "self-consciousness" which
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allows our voluntary "intentional" mntv-Ai . .y ulL Lio control over capacities for attend-
ing and acting (Pribram, 1980, pp . 50-51).
I cannot leave this section without mention of my favorite of
ah anatomical friends of consciousness
- the hippocampus. The
hippocampus (also a part of the limbic area and so-named because
someone thought it resembled a seahorse), is considered to be cen-
tral to information processsing and storage, but especially for new
information. It has a variety of kinds of cells which can "count
and remember," others which are "novelty-recording cells" and
which fire only in response to a new stimulus (Rose, 1976, p. 242;
Miller, 1981). Further, the hippocampus is credited with the capac-
ity to retain spatial "maps" and to represent spatial meaning for us
(MUler, 1981).
Perhaps most important, MiHer sees the hippocampus as the
central anatomical organ underlying intuitive capacity. It is con-
nected with widespread areas of the neocortex (higher levels) of
the brain, which allows it to "sample aU neocortical activity and
thus come under the influence of aU inputs to the neocortex" (1981,
p. 151). Because of the particular type of activity or plasticity of
its neurons described above, a "multidimensional space" or "omni-
connected network" is available to us for forming multiple associa-
tions from our knowledge store (p . 192)
.
Becoming aware of the messages our physical being may have
for us is not a new endeavor but neither is it widespread. To al-
low these messages or feelings to come through to consciousness
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could help, some believe, to increase the alternatives which pre-
sent us in everyday life. Eugene Gendlin refers to this as "bodily
awareness" or a "felt spikp" •which is a physical experience that
can be known to our conscious mind (Gendlin, 1978). We have
looked at the possibility of becoming aware of useful information by
attending to direct sensory information and how we feel. We now
examine our capacity for imagery
.
Self-Consciousness Through Imagery
In the previous chapter we looked carefully at how information
is stored in consciousness, suggesting that the holographic model
seems closest to an explanation for our wholistic intuitive critical
capacity. Healthy brains all possess this "omniconnected" capacity
of which Miller speaks. What is not common to all of us is the
ability to retrieve information from this store that can help us to
learn, and live, better. Roberto Assagioli, an Italian psychiatrist
and creator of a psychoanalytic method called "psychosynthesis",
has suggested that intuition is a function of consciousness which
has been repressed by what he calls the "contents of consciousness"
sensations, drives, emotions. These contents of consciousness
are what cause us difficulty in becoming self-conscious (1973, p.
11 ).
Limits to Self-Consciousness: Perception, Emotion, Values
and Attitudes
We have already considered, in fact, some examples of this
type which are an important part of the illusory function of con-
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sciousness but which inhibit critical consciousness. In Chapter
considered how the process of perception, based as it is
upon past experience and our limited physical capacity, causes us
hat we expect to see. In spite of the opportunity we have
for "choosing" this choosing can he limited by the contents of our
consciousness which may cause us to prejudge a situation or a per-
son without seeking new information. The ambiguous figure demon-
strated the difficulty in really seeing what is unexpected.
We have also looked at how emotion is linked with the categor-
ization of information and the limits this may place on retrieving
that information without the accompanying emotional state. We also
considered the complex possibility of being aware of a number of
"feelings" which might combine to create an emotional state but
which sometimes themselves overpower consciousness so that aware-
ness of the emotion is not clear.
Much earlier in the paper we considered a type of value or
attitude formation resulting from what Freire calls a limit- situation
where unjust treatment of a group by another is seen or valued
as appropriate because of inability to see the complete picture.
Donald Streets and Daniel Jordan have defined values as relatively
enduring organizations or complexes of information blended with
psychomotor, affective, perceptual, cognitive, and volitional pro-
cesses that predispose particular responses (1973, p. 303). Values,
and their component attitudes, are directly responsible for judgments
and actions we take.
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In each of these three examples it is possible to see that much
of what prevents us from being self-conscious in each case is that
information or processes involved are largely unconscious. Some
have described the totality of our thought and behavior as "biocog-
mtive mechanisms" or structures, proposing that over time, "...hab-
itual modes of perceiving and acting ... develop" so that we become
unconscious of these biocognitive structures (Davidson & Davidson,
1980, p. 40). The challenge is to become conscious of these struc-
tures as a form of insight which helps us to see that our style of
information processing and retrieval (our style of behavior and
thought) are "simply one way in which reality may be apprehend-
ed.
.
." (Davidson & Davidson, p. 41).
Intuitive Retrieval
This paper proposes that one way to accomplish self-conscious-
ness is to attempt to uncover the pathways which have caused our
responses to become habitual. That is, we need to learn new forms
of retrieving information from the vast distributed store so that
old habits can be changed and new ways of seeing things be possi-
ble. There is much to suggest that this type of retrieval is not
easy to accomplish
. In describing the feedforward system which
he believes allows us to be aware of our behavior, Pribram says
that these mechanisms or "communications
. . . take effort because
they involve the reorganization(s) of the structure of neural infor-
mation processing systems" (1980, p. 54).
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It is even a lament among neuroscientists that very little re-
search has been done on retrieval as compared with storage, very
possibly because it is a .'more difficult problem" (Rosenzweig, 1976
,
p. 596). We have all been frustrated with deliberate efforts at re-
calling information either for exact recall or for ideational purposes
and ending up with a "blank." Eccles refers to retrJeval ^
as "the most bothersome problem about memory." It requires, he
suggests, the initiation of some neural input to "trigger" the replay
of information (1973, p. 187 ) or a new synthesis. 3
Assagioli is representative of those who believe that cutting
through the unhelpful "contents of consciousness" can be best accom-
plished by retrieving information from the store (either as it went
m or in synthesized form) through the use of imagery. He has
constructed various activities requiring the formation of images to
help illuminate psychological problems. These exercises are also
useful in day-to-day activities or individuals who wish to become
more self-conscious about their thought and action. An example of
such an activity is included in the Appendix, entitled "As If".
Detailed reports exist of the role of imagery in dealing with emo-
tional problems, in particular, anxiety and fear (Lang, Gregory,
Miller and Levin, 1980, pp . 123-151).
What seems to be known about this type of retrieval is that it
requires a "receptive mode" oriented toward receiving information
from the internal environment rather than manipulating it as we
commonly but unconsciously do (Deikman, 1968, p. 325). In addi-
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tion, this type of retrieval emphasizes reflective behavior but in a
fairly nondirective way, i.e., searching the store but not reacting
what comes up or looking- for something else.
Skills for Intuitive Retrieval (Introspection i
In Chapter II we stated that to be self-conscious is to exer-
cise the power to reflect on how we change and are changed by
interaction with nature. To be self-conscious is to reflect on our
action. Action is both internal and external. But we are concerned
primarily with reflecting on the physical and psychological changes
which occur within us when we experience or act in daily life. We
have demonstrated the possibility of psychological awareness of
physiological change through attending to signals we might otherwise
not notice such as heart and respiration rates and feelings which
accompany emotional states. We have also indicated how imagery
can be used as a form of retrieval to become aware of stored experi-
ence that otherwise remains unconscious
.
Underlying all of these reflective efforts is the purpose of rec-
ognizing our ability to choose how we feel, what we perceive, what
our attitudes and values will be, and to what stimulae we will re-
spond. Chapter III has demonstrated that we do choose, whether
consciously or not. Our purpose in training intuition is to be aware
or self-conscious about this choosing. In this interpretation, being
self-conscious about how we choose implies awareness of our access
to the totality of consciousness, possibly to the entire distributed
store of knowledge we acquire as each moment passes. In this way
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we know that „e can develop the critical wholistic intuitive func-
tion of consciousness
.
Seeing the whole implies that our reflective capacity is also a
monitoring capacity. The skills described here are monitoring func-
tions which assist in retrieval. Although the words used to de-
scribe them are similar to those describing skills in "regular" learn-
ing or management activities, they are here seen to operate inter-
nally and for individual introspective use following the "endogenous"
monitoring system proposed by Routtenberg ( 1980
,
p. 115). The
skills described are gathered into three "skill areas": attending,
question-posing, and evaluating. For each skill area suggestions
fered for recognizing the skill and for commanding it. Guide
questions rather than suggestions are proposed for incorporating
the skill into curriculum, since each learning group is different.
Attending
Attending means what you might think
- paying attention to
something. It can also mean absorbing, concentrating. When you
are attending your brain is in a receptive state - you are receiving
information and you are paying conscious attention to it. That is,
your brain is always receiving information. You usually only attend
to part of what is being received; sometimes you attend to none of
what is being received; rarely and probably never could you attend
to all of what is being received
.
So attending means focusing on or paying attention to, or con -
sciously receiving a particular 'bit' of information. Attending also
Ill
implies physical activity on your Dart Tn *J p . I order to receive infor-
mation your senses are needed: you hear, see, smell, touch, taste
or otherwise sense a form of energy or matter. Your senses are
the receptors for the impulse that will eventually become the mes-
sage to your brain. Attending is a way of monitoring and improv-
ing perception.
Neurobiologically the function of attention is attributed in part
to a concentrated formation of neurons in the brain stem called the
reticular formation (Rose, 1976, p. 296).
How Does it Feel?
What does it ’feel’ like when we are attending - what are the
signals we recognize that can tell us whether we are focusing on
the ’right' thing at the 'right' moment or not? Think of a specific
situation, for example, the classroom. Ask yourself, am I paying
attention to what's being said or am I paying more attention to
something else? What does it feel like to pay attention in class?
All senses are focused on the same thing.
You feel alert, active, 'absorbent'.
You are directing your mind, choosing for it to be directed
by the classroom activity.
Non-essentials are being filtered out (noise outside, noise in
the hall, your other concerns.
Your mind feels 'engaged'
,
invigorated, like your body does
when exercising.
Looking at the opposite condition often helps to identify even more
clearly how it feels to attend. You might ask, what are the signals I
get when I'm not paying attention to the task at hand?
You 'daydream', your mind wanders to other thoughts.
You feel distracted.
You sleep.
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How Dp i Command the Skills of Attending?
' Gi
reVr;reiP
an order
- speaking °ut ioud *> y°-.
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r01 y°Ur environment
' Ask for quiet, for open windows,
fractions"
6nVir°"ment
-
“P^ »*»<* to ignore
Use a method or reminder. Associate looking at your watch
with coming back to attention.
How to Incorporate Attending into Curriculum
Guide questions:
What atmosphere promotes attending?
How to get attention and keep it engaged?
- How to encourage learners to 'get' and maintain their own
attention to the subject?
Identify indicators telling me learners' attention is held?
Evaluating
Evaluating encompasses reflecting and choosing. Some easy
examples are when you decide what to wear or what to make for
supper or when to cross the street. In the classroom or a learn-
ing situation evaluating most often takes place not on a conscious
level (except when learners are asked to evaluate a session). At
the not-conscious level, however, information is evaluated constantly
and categorized by the brain
.
One of the purposes of an empowering curriculum is to become
more conscious of this evaluating process
. By being aware of how
material is categorized by our brains
,
we become more aware of
values and attitudes and what might need adjustment. That is, we
become more critical of our own mental categories (and the actions
they may direct us in).
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Neurobiologically evaluating involves a comparison system very
possibly dependent on comparator cells which are able to "memorize’'
an impulse and compare it to those received in the past (Rose, 1976,
P- 133).
How Does it Feel?
What are the signals that tell us we are evaluating? Take get-
ting dressed as an example. What does it involve? Reviewing what
you have in your closet, thinking ahead to what you'll be doing,
considering the weather. Now get back inside yourself. How does
it feel to be pondering these ideas?
You are searching for information
.
You are imagining your day.
Weighing options for comfort, appearance.
- Being analytical.
Choosing, or preparing to choose.
Now take the example of crossing the street. You’d look both ways,
estimate the speed and distance of oncoming cars, judge when you
have the best chance of crossing, and take a risk by doing so.
We can add to the above list:
Estimating.
Judging.
Taking a risk.
Looking at the opposite, is it possible to know when you are not
evaluating when you could be? For example, do you ever take ac-
tion or make a decision when it doesn't feel quite right? Crossing
the road when you "know" you shouldn't; spending money when
you're not sure how much you have; listening to someone else's
ideas and not allowing yourself to consider them at all? What does
this feel like?
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You are stopping thoughts.
- Closing your mind.
- Switching to a different topic (not attending).Anger, anxiety, frustration.
Choosing to act on impulse.
Standing firm on your ground.
Skills of Evaluating?
ah6ad °f ttae that yOU 'U want to use this functionwhen you normally might not.
Be
iar7v7
that ^ need t0 ChCCk V3lUeS and attitudes regu-
durinp-
S
fh°
U
ri
mOVe fr°m °ne person or group to anothering t e day or from one situation to another with thesame people.
Have a series of questions to ask yourself in recurrent sit-
uations to learn to evaluate automatically.
Be aware that this function helps you check emotional re-
sponses
.
Make evaluating part of decision making and action.
How to Incorporate Evaluating into Curriculum
Guide questions:
What atmosphere promotes evaluating? - Relaxed, trusting.How do I need to explain evaluating to this group to get
rid of the idea that it means 'being tested' or examined?How to include it early and make sure evaluation happens
regularly in learners' minds and in daily activities?
- How to make it simple and not distracting?
- How to encourage group evaluation?
What evaluation methods can be repeated; when are new
ones needed and to be created by whom?
Question Posing
Questioning is a fascinating skill area, perhaps the least under-
stood. The use of interrogative words sets up a temporary void
which the brain strives to fill with information as it searches for
an appropriate response. Questioning is a creative function. But
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where do questions come from? Somehow
searching of categories for the creation of
a stimulus causes the
a question and this, in
turn, can set up mechanisms for retrieving material from new parts
Of the store or in new combinations.
Neurobiologically, the presence of the question mode or state
of mind might be related to the feedforward mechanism which is
believed to promote readiness and intentional behavior.
How Does it Fed?
Alert
.
Fast moving.
Passing over certain ideas and focusing on selected ones.Experimenting with interrogative words like "why", "what"how" until we get the one that seems right.
And how does it feel when you can't get the question out?
Blank.
Confusing.
Run-on thoughts
.
How Do I Command the Skills of Question Posing?
Plan ahead. Before an interview, class, appointment, dream,
think what questions you have before receiving information
or communicating at all. Do a dry-run of the meeting if
someone else is involved
.
Attend critically rather than attending receptively. Leave
your mind open for questions at the same time you are
receiving
.
to Incorporate Question Posing into Curriculum
Guide questions
:
How to encourage critical attending?
How to encourage critical reading, writing?
How to encourage attention to where and when questions
come to mind and where and when they don't come to
mind?
How to encourage learners to pose own questions around
whichto design curriculum?
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Considering these shill areas when designing curriculum may
yield learning experiences which enhance the critical consciousness
of the learner. Some learning activities which have demonstrated
usefulness in developing self-conscious awareness are contained in
the Appendix as examples. The purpose of the activities is to pro-
vide access through nontraditional pathways to the workings of con-
ciousness. They are ways of knowing which recognize a larger
P ial for sensory awareness of conscious experience. The final
activity is a composite of techniques in Self-Evaluation which I believe
are an essential part of the experiential learning cycle.
Subjective Knowing
This paper began by looking at some of the ideological opposi-
tions which have accompanied the growth of knowledge in our culture.
One of the main points of contention has been by what means the
individual acquires knowledge which can be proven, believed, con-
sidered truth, if you will. Evidence was presented, however, that
the positivist approach, which has held sway for some decades,
may need some adjusting; the need identified in part from 'new'
knowledge in the realm of physics and in part from the evidence of
social inadequacies of the present day
.
But what does this adjustment entail? Those engaged in the
formal acquisition of knowledge through scientific investigation are
asked to now consider themselves part of their experiments, to take
into account both the physical and mental effects they bring to the
endeavor. Those of us engaged more often in the nonformal acquisi-
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tion of personal knowledge from
of ourselves as conscious agents
day to day are asked to be aware
in our daily acts. For this type
of adjustment, the use of subjective methods of
to combine with those objective forms which we
part, employ.
knowing will need
now
,
for the most
In discussion on the creative
Brenman-Gibson expresses a view
and 'natural' scientists alike:
process, psychoanalyst Margaret
she finds growing among 'social'
The essential point I want to make here is that in thisour twentieth century, these two approaches to knowledge
are rapidly converging even within the scientific establish-
ment, and that the time is overdue for good minds in the
est consistently to apply the subjective as well as the
objective method of gaining knowledge (Brenman-Gibson
1973, p. 327).
Valuing subjective experience is central to the field of psychological
therapy and to artistic creativity. But for most of us, paying atten
ti°n to what does on "inside” of us - beyond the regular things
which we must pay attention to like hunger, fatigue, overt anger -
is not a familiar task. But in developing critical consciousness, in
becoming subjects who know and act (Freire p. 20), trusting our
experience of the activity of our consciousness is a task, at least
to be practiced if not mastered. We need to accept the primary
definition of subjective as quoted in Chapter II and learn to trust
our experience of "...the real nature of things..." The delineation
of the skill areas above may help to simplify the task of acquiring
knowledge through introspection. For although introspection may
be a "fickle source" (Miller, 1981, p. 198) when seeking agreement
with others it is unavoidably relevant for self-conscious development.
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Educational Settings
ve said that training our intuitive capacity requires atten
tion to feelings, emotion, our internal private selves. In addition,
it requires the use of imagery. Studies have shown that use of
intuition involves a tolerance for ambiguity and a significant amount
of risk-taking (Westcott, 1968, p. 94-5). This implies the need
for a learning environment free from threat and the fear which can
result from a threatening atmosphere. Even though our intuitive
capacity is primarily a function of the upper hemispheres or the
neocortex it can still be affected by the so-called reptilian and lim-
bic systems which regulate emotion, hence, fear. In a situation
which inspires fear these systems can overpower the intuitive func-
tion, paralyzing it in a sense, causing the learner to withdraw or
"flee" from the situation, rather than learning. Leslie Hart, in his
book entitled Human Brain and Human Learning
, has stressed the
need for nonthreatening "ambiance" in the learning environment
(1983, p. 133). What kind of educational setting can create this
environment?
In Chapter I, we stated that the experiential learning cycle
most closely expressed the relationship between experience and
learning which supports this study. To go further, however, two
more components are necessary to complete a learning environment
which contributes directly to the development of the critical func-
tion of consciousness
. They are the participatory and empowering
models
. The participatory model is based on an atmosphere of re-
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spect; learning content has immediacy for people's daily lives; all
learners share in the leadership of the group; and much of the
learning is derived from learners' experience (both from the past
and during learning activities).
The empowerment model (Kindervatter, 1979 ) adds to these
two groups or characteristics the focus on small group interaction;
content which stresses self-reliance
; a design which includes trans-
ferring responsibility for the learning program to the learners; a
non-hierarchical structure; and content which is directed toward
improving learner's economic, social and political standing (Kinder-
vatter, p. 150-152).
This combination of characteristics provides a framework (please
see Figure 11) within which learners can feel free to seek and dis-
cover the illusory aspects of their lives and society and to create,
when necessary, totally new alternatives for liberation
.
Summary
In this chapter we have looked at the physiological base of
learning known as plasticity and the accompanying physical and
psychological signals which are all a part of learning. We have
examined the possible explanation of our self-conscious capacity at
the physiological level in the special nerve cells of the hippocampus
and their multiconnectedness with the neocortex. This capacity
was linked to our ability to create images
. Imagery was then con-
sidered as a "new" form of retrieving information from the whole of
consciousness by training ourselves to overcome certain limits to
self-consciousness such as perception and emotion.
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Three skill areas were outlined which can help us to make use
Of this capacity for a "new" fonn of retrieval: attending, evaluating,
and question posing. These skill areas were described as helpful
for developing introspection and as a means for subjective knowing.
Activities demonstrating the use of these skills are described in
the Appendix.
Finally
,
a framework was defined describing critical conscious-
ness as transformation and reflection. The framework illustrates
how self-consciousness, through reflective practice, monitoring skills
,
and program design can give us access to our intuitive, critical
capacity for self-conscious choice. The components of this frame-
work include not only the skill areas defined but the innate mech-
anisms of imagery and feeling which can be employed to have greater
access to consciousness. The framework also includes the essential
components of content stressing self-reliance and economic, social
and political justice as well as a structure which is participatory.
This combination of components creates a framework for the devel-
opment of critical consciousness.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to bring a clearer understanding to
teachers and learners of that part of ourselves we are so intent
upon affecting. Whenever a new approach to teaching and learning
is presented there is often an implication that no one has been able,
really
,
to teach or learn properly before its presentation. That is
not the implication of this study. We all learn, in many ways, all
the time; if we consider learning at the level of the synapse, there
is really no way to stop one’s learning. And as all of us know who
remember our best teachers, it is difficult to stop a good teacher
from helping you learn.
The significance of this view of intuition as one level of an
open, dissipative system which is capable of achieving continual
change without complete destruction of itself is that those teachers
who have always known how to help others learn but were not sure
how they did it can begin to understand this creative process. In
her book Teacher
,
Sylvia Ashton-Warner graphically describes her
own intuitive process of helping children along the path to discovery
and self-consciousness
. She relied on the natural ability and inclina-
tion of her young students to question, test hypotheses, reflect on
the results and try again. She gave them the opportunity to put
into their own framework the pieces of information and the actual
experiences she knew they would somehow, sometime need (Ashton-
Warner, 1963).
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his open system framework for consciousness and the role
of intuition in learning can also help learners themselves to make
better use of their own capacities. Although we are each a differ-
ent combination of matter, energy, and ability, the physiological
and psychological systems described here are something each of us
can rely on as a base from which to begin. Even when brain mech-
anisms are damaged by accident or illness their remarkable ability
to recreate learning and acting capacities has been documented both
in the physical sciences and in psychoanalysis (Luria, 1973; Assagioli,
1973).
Making use of these basic capacities is an innate operation which,
as we have said, is very difficult to prevent. The challenge as
the paper suggests
,
is to develop those aspects of our conscious
capacity which require self-conscious attention. Some have sug-
gested that the need for the development of intuition and a wholistic
capacity of consciousness is part of a movement which is traceable
through history but which has, until now, not received serious atten-
tion from enough sources (Ferguson, 1980). Whether, indeed, we
are at the dawn of the Aquarian Age will have to be determined
elsewhere. What seems clear from developments in physics and the
neurosciences and the coming together across formerly fairly rigid
disciplinary boundaries of scientists and educators is a new call
for education to address itself to the need for self-consciousness
in learning
.
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the House of Cards
To become aware of our own learning proceases, to intervene
to change behavior, actions, even perception, is what is implied
by this caU. At the same time, this kind of awareness may have a
difficult, perhaps even frightening prospect. Being able to perceive
reality at more than one level in the physical sense has in the past
been left to those engaged in transcendental meditation and hallucin-
ogenic excursions. Taken to their limit some of the ideas in this
paper imply that each of us is able to perceive reality at many levels.
For example (using "left" and "right" brain distinctions for simplicity)
what if the traditional division between materialist and idealist views
comes from the left brain, right brain tendencies (respectively) --
always vying with each other but not quite in unity. Hence the
left" brain is concerned with the material, the concrete, what can
be "proven" objectively and observed through our senses. The
right brain constructs wholistic pictures and is concerned with
the aesthetic, the intangible. But enter the paradox. The "right"
brain is the one that is capable of discerning the concrete directly.
And the 'concrete," the reality, is, of course, waves, particles,
relationships, change, the dissipation (constant use) of energy.
On the other hand, it is the "left" brain's task to translate this
quantum reality into the daily illusory reality (though we view it
as concrete). And for some reason (to avoid confusion, to avoid
giving us too many choices?) the "right" brain does not make its
information directly known to us, but slips it by our daily conscious-
ness and into "lefty's" grasp.
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Whether or not the age-old materialist/idealist debate is con-
nected to these complementary brain functions, the fact remains
that other levels of reality than those we "see" each day do exist.
The "house of cards" that is our daily illusory reality may be more
than nudged as we continue to learn more about other realities from
physics, chemistry, biology. Being open to information from these
fields is crucial for educators. In 1971, Jerome Bruner recommended
that we pay more attention to what physics can teach us about the
"observed surface" (our illusory reality) and the "structure of regu-
larity" (quantum reality) underneath it. He wrote:
hysics is not so much a topic as a mode of thought, (it is) an
apparatus for processing knowledge about nature (rather) than
a collection of facts... (it can help us learn to) process unrelatedthings... (it is) a constant exercise in problem solving (p. 109).
Indeed, perhaps physics can help us to see how our own con-
consciousness is capable of processing "unrelated" things. One of
the significant aspects of physics (and most science) is its system
for measuring what is going on. Why do we need to measure? To
pinpoint things in time and space; to attach numbers to the object
of observation so that we can discuss and communicate about it and
compare and contrast these data with other data. Measurement is a
necessary part of our being able to communicate about something.
Measuring translates something intangible into a symbol system
(mathematics) which allows us to discuss the events we are ob-
serving in the abstract. Discussion is abstracting (pulling away
from the concrete)
.
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This process of measuring- and symbolizing is part of the trans-
formation which our brains accomplish (recall Einstein, Poincare)
when we transform events into language (and theory). Take the
example from above where our "left" or illusory function has the
task of presenting the quantum reality to us as daily trees and
flowers. The "right" or critical function has already taken in this
information and it becomes transformed, perhaps through some coop-
erative activity of both functions. This process bears a resemblance
to the "measurement" which occurs in quantum mechanical experiments:
The point to think about is that when we make a measurementm a quantum mechanical experiment - when the observed system(remember the photon?) interacts with the observing system(us) - we reduce a multidimensional reality to a three-dimensional
reality compatible with our experience (Zukav, 1979, p. 76).
The quantum reality of waves and particles (the observed system)
comes m contact with our consciousness (the observing system)
and is transformed into a reality compatible with our experience.
Choosing our Reality - Stabilizing the Cards
And, one may well ask, won't this knowledge of many possible
realities be more confusing than it is helpful? It may well be more
confusing than helpful unless we develop our capacity for choosing
which reality we want to live in. The significance of the capacity
of consciousness for choosing realities becomes clear at the social
action level. Being able to perceive more than one level of reality
at the social level can lead to dramatic changes in political and some-
times social structures. But since we all choose all the time, how
do we consciously choose the "best" reality? There is no guarantee.
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But some social scientists are joining themselves with Prigogine and
others from the natural sciences in exploring what positive social
effects can evolve for humanity from the "evolutionary vision" men-
tioned in Chapter II
.
Boulding has done what she calls "life span" studies on indi-
viduals to ascertain how their consciousness develops regarding
how they "image" or "vision" the future. She categorizes people
according- to the following modes:
1. Essence optimism combined with influence optimism: "The
world is good and humans can make it even better."
Essence optimism combined with influence pessimism: "The
world is good, but it goes of itself and humans cannot alter
the course of events
.
"
3. Essence pessimism combined with influence optimism: "The
world is bad, but humans can make it better."
4. Essence pessimism combined with influence pessimism: "The
world is bad and there isn't a damn thing humans can do
about it." (Boulding, 1981, p. 179).
Responses seem to indicate that a "self-organizing" principle is op-
erative in individual consciousness so that at some stage in the
lives of those interviewed both over-optimistic and over-pessimistic
world views become modified based not just on experience in the
world but also on the "evolutionary vision" from within. In his
summary of Boulding's work, Jantsch describes this period as the
time when "knowledge blends with wisdom" and when "evolutionary
visions appear as the structures emerging from the self-organization
processes in the human mind" (1981, p. 11).
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Boulding describes her own work as beginning bridging the
gap between the knowledge of evolutionary processes in the physical
and biological sciences and the knowledge of human development in
the social sciences. She is cautious yet hopeful about our capacity
for choosing- the "best" reality:
.
lwve oeen extant more or less fmm
that rela,iveiy ut«r
Eg™. ? -tunespans the tunespan of recorded history is short thevidence from the exploratory study described here is that
precfs^v
C
what
n * <the temP° °f gr°Wth hu”a" wisdom) iscisely comes m the later years of an individual'slife. We may. after all. be on the threshold of significant
evnh?,
10US COntributions to ‘he socio-cultural dimensions of theolutionary process (Boulding, 1981, p. 192 ).
The evolutionary vision which stems from discoveries in modern
thermodynamics seems to me to be directly related to the development
of a self-conscious social system which both implies and requires
the development of our critical consciousness as individuals in society
The development of this wholistic critical function which improves
our capacity for choosing- implies both new directions in education
and a new perspective on social change. Our role as teachers is
to grasp the significance of the levels of our reality and their con-
nections and to help learners do the same. Ira Shor, in his book,
— Teaching and Everyday Life
,
puts it this way:
I can't imagine a more optimistic way to go about education.
The grand conception of teaching as preparing students for
their history-making roles defines our work as the restoration
of our full humanity (1980, p. 269).
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The "new direction" in education is to point out to ,earners their
roie as history makers. The new perspective on social change is
to borrow from the self-organising structures of thermodynamics
the concept that growth and development are possible without
abusing people physically and mentally and without destroying the
earth's environment.
This excursion into consciousness may bring our intuitive ca-
pacity out from its mystical hiding place while at the same time just
opening the door a tiny bit to the possibilities which lie within the
brain. Without doubt those mysteries can challenge us to greater
discovery. For now, however, what we can glean from this excur-
sion reveals a responsibility to address the social and political struc
tures which, without self-consciousness, continue to create oppres-
sion. If, as Freire says, domination has been the theme of our
epoch, liberation through critical consciousness is the theme of edu-
cation
.
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Sheddin^Light on the Sublet
One way in which quantum mechanics is often explained is by
describing experiments that involve photons, or quanta of light.
The question of what the real nature of light is has fascinated scien
for a long time. Light is that part of the electromagnetic spec-
trum which is visible to the human eye. The electromagnetic spec-
trum (please see Figure 7) includes all the types of energy or "rays
that we know about, for example, x-rays, infra-red light, radar,
sound. It has long been understood that these forms of radiation
or energy behave with the characteristics of waves. It is possible
to measure the frequency and amplitude of light waves just as it is
of ocean waves
.
The confusing, and eventually revealing, thing about light
(and other forms of electromagnetic energy) is that in addition to
acting like a wave, it also behaves as if it were composed of parti-
cles, photons as Einstein called them, or "quanta" in the words of
Max Planck. The fact that light demonstrates wave-like properties
of diffraction and interference seemed not to be possible if it also
behaved like particles, as in the "photoelectric effect" when a beam
of light is directed at a metal plate and the plate ejects a shower
of electrons indicating that the photons were hitting electrons with
an individual, billiard ball- type effect (Barnett, 1948, p. 25).
In 1925 Louis de Broglie demonstrated that electrons, which
were understood for a long time to be hard spherical particles,
could also behave like waves . Schrodinger developed a mathematical
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method for explaining the "wave functions" of these particies of
matter (which we commonly know as electrons, protons, atoms and
molecules) (Barnett, p. 29), Thus Einstein’s theoretical demonstra-
tion that energy and matter are different forms of the same thing
continued to be proven as wave-like energy (light) behaved like
particles and particle-like matter (electrons) behaved like waves of
energy
.
In these demonstrations scientists were observing phenomena
which their paradigms or belief structures could not explain or
would discount as false. But in the continual search for explana-
tions eventually and gradually new paradigms are built which accom-
modate what was formerly inexplicable. Thus Schrodinger, Bohr
and Heisenberg, among others, contributed to a mathematical expla-
nation involving "waves of probability" which could be used to pre-
dict the behavior of these confusing particle/waves of energy and
matter.
Probability and Perception
If we look again at the situation illustrating Heisenberg's Uncer-
tainty Principle where the limitations of our own visual apparatus
prevent us from measuring both the speed and position of an elec-
tron without disturbing one or the other with a beam of energy,
these waves of probability come in handy. They allow the observer
to at least predict the speed or position of the electron within some
range of probability acceptable to other scientists as valid experi-
mental evidence. Thus it becomes possible to record systematically
these "observations" of subatomic phenomena.
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This type of probability is, however, somewhat different from
the regular idea of probability - the prediction of a likely event
ih_the future
. This type of probability refers instead to something
that is actually happening but at a level at which we are not neces-
sarily able to apprehend it. Zukav refers to such probable happen-
mgs as "tendencies to happen" with probability waves being cata-
logues of these tendencies (1979, p. 66). To demonstrate these
tendencies he describes the experiment used to show that a "particle'
of light, a photon, has both wave-like qualities and particle qualities
In this experiment, the photon is beamed at an upright surface
with two slits in it side-by-side. When one slit is covered the light
reaches the wall behind the surface and forms an uninterrupted
circle of light. When light travels through both slits, however,
instead of a wider circle of light on the back wall, what appears is
a series of alternating light and dark vertical strips which are a
wave-like or interference pattern found in water and sound waves
as well. The question which quantum physicists try to answer in
this case is how does the photon "know" whether to behave like a
particle or like a wave? That is, if only one slit is open, the pho-
ton apparently travels through it and forms a particle-like circle of
light on the wall. But when both slits are open, this single photon
can travel through both slits at once to form an interference pattern
on the wall
.
One version of the waves of probability theory answers this
dilemma by proposing that at any one time there are an infinite num-
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ber of probable ways in which the photon could behave and that
what causes the "actualizing" of one of those probabilities is our
own observation of that event. Zukav states it this way:
In a quantum mechanical experiment, the observed system
* ' photon m case) travelling undisturbed between theregion of preparation (the light source) and the region ofmeasurement (the wall), develops according to the Schrodingerwave equation. During this time, all of the allowed thingshat could happen to it unfold as a developing wave function.However as soon as it (the photon) interacts with a measuringdevice (the observing system or us) one of those possibilities
actualizes and the rest cease to exist. The quantum leap isfrom a multifaceted potentiality to a single actuality (1979
p. 75). ’
This view implies that by an act of perception we "choose"
that one of a number of possible events which win actualize or hap-
pen. What physicists seem to be saying is that we are inextricably
related to the matter which we manipulate during experiments. We
cannot view them as an activity outside our personal influence.
We are part of the activity. The results of the experiment are a
result of the action of our consciousness upon the "system" of the
experiment itself. We are involved personally, subjectively, in the
experiment.
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Activity 1
"As If" *
You are asked to relax, clear your mind, and to imagine a
situation in which you often find yourself (or expect soon to find
yourself) when a strong emotion gets the better of you. Imagine
the scene (for example an encounter with an authority figure) all
the way through as it might happen, at its worst. Then imagine
yourself and a characteristic you would like to have or a manner
you wish to maintain throughout such an encounter. See yourself
m every aspect; feel how you would want to feel; keep this image
until it is very strong; practice recalling it. Then reconstruct the
encounter, only this time with your new image. See it through to
a preferred conclusion; try various alternatives. Relax again, dis-
solving all images
.
Repetition of such exercises has helped individuals expand
their capacity ot change behavior in various situations
.
* From Assagioli, Roberto, The Act of Will
,
(Baltimore: Penguin,
1973) p. 79.
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Activity 2
"Seven Questions" *
Sit in a relaxed position, breathe quietly and clear the mind
receiving images. Using crayons and paper, draw the image
receive following each question. After each image is drawn
may write what it represents to you if you like.
1
. Where am I now?
2. Where am I coming from?
3. What does change mean to me?
4. How would I like to be?
5. What's stopping me?
6. What do I need to get there?
7. Draw a self-portrait.
* Adapted from psychosynthesis techniques.
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"Sinbad" *
Activity 3
1 his activity is useful with people in groups who need to work
°^
e y ,0 £>ether and who need to become aware of values theyhod which may cause conflict in the group. This exercisehelps point out that discovering values is an involved process.
The essence of the famous tale of Sinbad is that a young woman,
in order to reach her betrothed who is across the raging river,
agrees to make love to Sinbad, the operator of the only ferryboat
to be found. The tale, involving other characters, can be read si-
lently, or narrated and illustrated. Listeners are asked to rate
each character in order from 'best to worst' and, depending on the
objectives of facilitators and size of the group, may then be re-
quested to integrate their rankings with others and come up with a
consensus list.. Discussion questions such as "who was worst and
why?" or "what would you have done in so-and-so's place and why?"
often lead people to state and defend a position they were not aware
they held
. Reflection for days following the exercise is also a signif-
icant part of becoming self-conscious about one's values.
* Adapted from Peace Corps training materials.
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Activity 4 *
The Choice Point
Now we will examine a way of using introspection in a practical
way. Imagine you are walking down a dark, empty street at night
and you see a figure weaving uncertainly toward you. What goes
through your mind? You probably attempt to make sense out of
what you see, to categorize the figure based on your experience.
Your categorization will also be influenced by the immediate environ-
ment (darkness, no other people). You may decide that this figure
who cannot walk straight is drunk and therefore it is better for
you to cross over to the other side of the street. You may do so,
or you may continue to walk undecided until the person comes close
enough for you to see more clearly who it is. You find, with some
relief
,
it is an elderly person having some difficulty breathing who
could use your assistance to reach his door some few feet away,
and you provide that assistance.
The cycle of mental behavior we identified looked like this:
Observation ^ Perception ^ Judgment ^ Action
Choice 1 Choice 2
* Designed for crosscultural training, 1977, School for International
Training, Brattleboro, Vermont. Special acknowledgment to Peter
Falion
.
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In the example above, you observed the person coming toward you,
your perceptive apparatus told you it was a person, not walking
straight, hunched over. You then had the opportunity to make a
judgment about how you would relate to this person and whether it
would be wise to cross the street, that is what immediate action to
take. Somewhere between the arrival of information into your con-
scious mind and the point at which you decided to continue walking
toward this person, there was an opportunity for you to choose
what judgment you would make about this person. A second oppor-
tunity for choice in this "mental behavior sequence" occurs following
the judgment and before the action.
Recognizing the Choice Point - Using a Reflective Sequence
In Chapter II it was stated that as we experience through our
senses, both physiological and psychological change occurs in con-
sciousness. For example, in the dark street scenario just described
the visual process itself produces chemical and electrical changes
in the brain. It is proposed that at each point along the sequence,
and especially at the choice points, there is not only change, but
the potential for self-consciously intervening to "rearrange" not
only physiological connections, but psychological categories. If
you judged that the person was drunk based on your perception
and crossed the street, normal changes would occur which accom-
pany any action. However, if you judged the person was drunk
and stayed around to find out you were mistaken, it is hypothe-
sized that your perceptual categories would become altered . There-
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after, perhaps, when viewing someone walking in a manner strange
to you, the "he/she is drunk" hypothesis would be accompanied or
superceded by "this person is having- trouble walking."
Whether or not this new response occurs could depend on how
often you find yourself in a similar situation. The occurrence of
this new response will also depend on whether you consciously
choose to exercise it. The key is to know that you can intervene
m your own mental behavior in order to change it. This interven-
tion required a reflective sequence of events which generally follows
the pattern of questioning, reflecting, choosing and acting, however,
like the experiential learning cycle, one might begin at any point
and follow the sequence
.
In order to teach ourselves and other people to become more
self-conscious about their capacity for choosing to influence their
own thought and behavior, the sequence provides a useful tool for
describing the microlevel process of consciousness. Just as with
any point on the experiential learning cycle, also at any point in
the observation-perception-choice-action sequence it is possible to
intervene to change behavior. First by questioning, "What is going
on, what do I think I see, can I see it another way?"; then by
reflecting on the possible answers to those questions; then by
choosing to implement one of them; then by acting.
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Activity 5 *
When looking at Figure 12 it is possible to see at least two
different images, one of a lady with a hat and feather, another of
a lady wearing a scarf. Usually only one image will be immediately
perceptable to you. Once it is clear, then try to see the other.
Then allow yourself to see one, then the other with less and less
time in between. But attempt to pay attention to that "time" in
between seeing one or the other image. Then simply look at the
figure and be aware of when one or the other image comes clear to
you. In this last case, observe which image is stronger for you
without consciously choosing which to see. It is possible to imagine
that in this activity your perceptual apparatus was "choosing" which
image to see, based upon what you are used to seeing and how you
make sense of what you see. Presumably, when you intervened to
see one or the other image of your choice, this sequence was active
and at a very rapid rate.
* Adapted for crosscultural training from figure/ground optical illusion
by Boring.
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Figure 12: Ladies
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TECHNIQUES IN SELF-EVALUATION
Self-evaluation techniques for the learner to use 'alone.'
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
RNING CONTRACT - to design your own plan for learning
something; to monitor your activities while learning; to create
a product as evidence of your learning; to design criteria or
standards to validate your learning (Knowles, Self-Directed
Learning ) . —
KEEPING A JOURNAL - to record factual events that affect you-
to record how you felt about those events; to maintain a record’
for comparison in the future.
PEER COUNSELLING - to discuss with a friend or colleague on a
regular basis your behavior and feelings toward a person, or in
regard to a problem.
PERSONAL GOAL-SETTING - to write down your goals or expec-
tations for the day, a week, a month, or for a particular event,
and later compare your expectations with what really happened;
to assess why your goals were or were not met.
SELF-DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS - to develop a model for a behavior
or skill you desire to learn or improve; to assess your level of
performance in this behavior; to assess what action you must
take to move from your present level of performance to the
desired level (Knowles, Self-Directed Learning).
Self-Evaluation techniques for the learner to use with a group
.
A. FEEDBACK - to evaluate how you perceive others and how
others perceive you ; to share opinions about what is happen-
ing
,
why it is happening and how it might be different. Feed-
back can be written, spoken, or non-verbal (through body
language) .
B. INTERVENTION - interrupting a discussion, a meeting, a training
session to resolve a conflict; to demonstrate a point about indi-
vidual or group behavior.
C. ROLE PLAY, SIMULATION, CRITICAL INCIDENT - to observe
how people interact with each other and to analyze why they
behave the way they do. These activities are designed to
allow the learner to question and reflect, judge, to choose,
and to act as they would in 'real life.' Each activity is then
processed or discussed so learners may try to identify the
attitudes and values determining their behavior.
D. GROUP-DIRECTED ACTIVITY - to design and implement an
evaluation activity, either spontaneously or with prior planning,
in which each group member contributes something to the design
.
The activity is implemented by the group sharing leadership
(that is, the trainer, staff supervisor, or facilitator does not
intervene)
.
* Developed and used 9 February 1979 in Evaluation workshop with
Indonesian Advanced Management Training Seminar.


